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Abstract 
 
The purpose of the study is to better understand human capital investment decisions of the 
working poor, and to collect information that can be used to design a policy to induce the poor to 
invest in human capital.  We use laboratory experimental methodology to elicit the preferences 
and observe the choices of the target population of a proposed government policy. We recruited 
256 subjects in Montreal, Canada; 72 percent had income below 120 percent of the Canadian 
poverty level. The combination of survey measures and actual decisions allows us to better 
understand individual heterogeneity in responses to different subsidy levels. In particular, 
participants chose between various cash alternatives and educational subsidies, for themselves 
and for a family member, allowing for the construction of two measures of willingness to invest 
in education. Two behavioral characteristics, patience and attitude towards risk, are key to 
understanding the determinants of educational investment for the low-income individuals in this 
experiment. The decision to save for a family member’s education is somewhat different from 
that of investing in one’s own education. Patient participants were more likely to save for a 
family member’s education, but in contrast to investing in one’s own education, a subject’s 
attitude towards risk played no role.  
 
Keywords: Intertemporal choice, field experiments, risk attitudes, working poor. 
 
JEL Classification: C93 – Laboratory Experiments, D91 - Intertemporal and Investment 
Consumer Choice, D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty 
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1. Introduction 
Returns to investment in human capital have been high in the last half of the 20th century, 
but at the bottom of the income distribution, the decision to invest in education beyond high 
school is still seen as complex and risky (Chen, 2002). To the educated, investment in education 
seems the obvious and only way to escape poverty, yet the poor avoid such investments. We 
report the results of a study designed to better understand human capital decisions by the poor.  
A secondary purpose of the study is to collect information that could be used to design a policy 
to encourage the poor to save and invest in human capital.  We use laboratory experimental 
methodology to measure the preferences and choices of a sample of low-income subjects in 
Montreal, Canada.  Note that our purpose is not program evaluation; in particular, we do not 
attempt to discover the return to additional human capital investment or to assess whether a 
policy to subsidize human capital acquisition by the poor would be cost-effective.  Instead we 
collect information that could be used to improve the design of such a policy by eliciting 
preferences for education using actual choices between cash and funds designated for education 
expenses, and assessing the response of the investment decisions of the poor population to 
various subsidy levels. 
Our study is part of a growing emphasis on laboratory experiments in field settings that 
focus on low-income populations, primarily in developing countries (e.g., Ashraf 2009, 
Binswanger 1980, de Oliveira et al. 2011, Harrison et al. 2009, Karlan 2005, Meier and Sprenger 
2010, Tanaka et al. 2010.  See also Banerjee and Duflo 2008, and Cardenas and Carpenter 2008 
for overviews). In particular, we use incentivized decisions as tools in the field to elicit the 
underlying preferences of the poor for investment in human capital.  In general, this approach is 
potentially fruitful for collecting information in order to design, calibrate, and estimate the 
impact and cost of specific government policies.1 Gauging the response of the target population 
in a lab setting can help policy makers estimate the response to specific policy parameters. 
Our study has several key characteristics. First, our subjects are the target population for 
a proposed policy intervention in Canada: the adult working poor.  We recruited 256 subjects in 
                                                
1 Roth (2002) makes the case for the use of experimental research in the design of market and nonmarket 
institutions.  His discussion focuses on the use of experiments to estimate the response of markets and other 
institutions to changes in structure and parameters.  Our study focuses on the direct measurement of preferences and 
their relation to human capital investment. 
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Montreal, Canada; 72 percent had income below 120 percent of the Canadian poverty level.2  
Thus we examine the response of subjects who represent the population of interest to policy 
makers, and gauge their responsiveness to a range of parameters.   
Second, the study combines attitudinal survey questions with incentivized choices.   The 
experiments are of two types: one type involves decisions that are designed to measure the 
subjects’ risk attitudes and time preferences; the second type consists of decisions designed to 
elicit willingness to invest in education for themselves or for family members.  In this second set 
of choices, subjects choose between cash amounts and higher amounts that are earmarked for 
educational investment.  The survey collects demographic characteristics and other control 
variables.  The combination of survey measures and actual decisions allows us to better 
understand individual heterogeneity in responses to different subsidy levels.   
A third factor is that the experiments, especially those involving actual human capital 
decisions, involve high stakes.  Previous studies have shown the importance of using significant 
stakes in eliciting preferences (Binswanger 1980, Holt and Laury 2002, Slonim and Roth 1998,) 
Subjects make 63 decisions, with $25-$600 CA at stake: at the end of the experiment, one 
decision is chosen randomly for payment.  Average earnings were $147 including a $12 show-up 
fee. For the investment decisions, the incentives are high enough that subjects could increase 
human capital investment by taking one or more courses at a Montreal technical, career, trade or 
community college.3   
Our data permit a rich analysis of the decision to invest in human capital, including 
important control variables not available in other studies. Controlling for demographic 
characteristics such as age, sex, family structure and income, we can examine the role of risk 
attitudes and time preference in the investment decision.  We also can test for the responsiveness 
of various subsets of the poor population to subsidies targeted toward their own education as 
well as that of their children, conditional on their underlying preferences. 
Two behavioral characteristics, patience and attitude towards risk, are key to 
understanding the determinants of educational investment for the low-income individuals in this 
                                                
2 Statistics Canada annually publishes a set of measures called the low income cut-offs (LICOs). Roughly speaking, 
the cut-offs mark income levels in which people have to spend disproportionate amounts of their income on food, 
shelter, and clothing. The LICOs vary by family size and size of community. Before-tax income cut-offs were used 
in view of the fact that before-tax income data was collected from the respondents. 
3 See www.canadian-universities.net for a listing of such schools.  At the time of the study, single courses cost $30-
$300. 
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experiment. On average 65 percent of the least patient subjects never chose to invest in education 
compared with only 24 percent of the most patient subjects. The younger, more risk-taking  
subjects are far more likely to choose educational expense over cash. On average 41 percent 
chose funds earmarked for educational expenses over a cash alternative in all cases when offered 
in the experiment, whereas their older and more risk-averse counterparts exhibited this behavior 
only 15 percent of the time. The decision to invest for a family member’s education is somewhat 
different from that of investing in one’s own education. Patient participants were more likely to 
choose a family member’s education, but in contrast to investing in one’s own education, a 
subject’s attitude towards risk played no role.  
In section II, we discuss the human capital decision of the adult poor. In section III, we 
present our research design and methods. The experimental results are discussed in section IV. A 
concluding section ends the paper.   
 
2. The Human Capital Decision of Adults 
When considering an investment in education, it is well known that an individual will 
consider opportunity cost along with evaluating the potential benefit. Traditional research has 
focused mainly on the decision to enter the labor market or to continue formal training. Risk 
attitudes and a preference for current consumption over future consumption are recognized as 
important factors contributing to the schooling decision; for example, Weiss (1972) argues that 
the variance of income increases for higher levels of education, and this variability may 
discourage more risk-averse individuals.  The importance of credit constraints for some groups 
also has been investigated, but remains an unsettled issue (Dynarski 2002).  Eckel et al. (2007) 
show that aversion to debt among low-income individuals may also play a role in limiting 
investment in human capital.   
A further consideration is that the context of the investment decision may differ 
considerably, depending on the age of the decision maker.  Adults may see the choice very 
differently from high-school age decision makers.  Adults might have experienced personal 
failures such as marital difficulties, unstable working conditions, recurrent spells of 
unemployment, or prior low-return educational investments. Furthermore, adults with children 
face additional time and financial constraints. Thus, for adults, the decision to undertake an 
educational program appears more complex and more risky than for younger decision makers. 
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For poor adults, all of the considerations listed above will be compounded by financial 
constraints. This suggests that the barriers to a decision to accept and invest in educational 
opportunities for the adult poor are numerous and important. 
Consideration of the role of individual attitudes towards risk and consumption over time 
in the education decision are not new in the human capital literature. Levahari and Weiss (1974) 
produced an early study on the role of risk and uncertainty on investment in human capital using 
a Fisherian two-period model.  They show that uncertainty is an important factor, but that the 
effect of increased uncertainty is ambiguous and is context-dependent. For Chen (2002), 
reluctance to attend college by some young people is explained by the risks of investment in 
education that result from incomplete information about individual ability, the quality of 
education and unanticipated changes in labor market conditions. Chen suggests that when 
discussing investment in human capital, it is important to distinguish risk tolerance from 
perceptions of risk. A risk-averse high school student might prefer education to the labor market 
if she perceives the risk in the labor market to be greater than continuing with her schooling. For 
this person, the labor market is not only risky, but also uncertain because of her lack of 
experience in that sector of activity. For a labor market participant, the situation is essentially 
reversed: an investment in human capital appears more risky or uncertain than what she might 
have experienced in the labor market. Therefore, with the same risk-averse attitude, a person of 
school age will prefer to continue with her investment in education, while an adult will prefer to 
remain in the labor market. In our study, we find that younger, more risk seeking participants in 
contrast to older, more risk averse participants are more likely to invest in education for 
themselves. 
Time preference is also a key factor in the decision to invest in human capital.  The 
decision to forego current for future consumption is fundamental for human capital theory, which 
relies heavily on the discounted utility model first proposed by Samuelson (1937).4 Human 
capital investment features early costs coupled with returns late in the life cycle. In the standard 
decision framework, and with perfect credit markets, individuals maximize the present value of 
                                                
4 This model assumes that a person’s preferences are time-consistent: that he will make the same choice no matter 
when he or she is asked.  In a review of empirical and experimental studies of discount rates, Frederick, 
Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002) note evidence that discount rates are not constant.  They conclude that 
discount rates may decline over time, gains are discounted more than losses, and small amounts more than large 
amounts. To our knowledge, the impact of these issues has not been worked out in the context of human capital 
investment decisions.  
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lifetime income using market interest rate to discount future earnings and allocate consumption 
over time according to their own rate of time preference (see Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2008 
for a thorough discussion of the earning function and rates of return). Across the board, more 
patient participants in our study are more likely to invest in education for themselves and for 
family members. 
Our experiment also may inform the debate on the importance of liquidity constraints in 
human capital decisions by working poor adults. In a study of the Pell Grant education-funding 
program, Stefor and Turner (2002) show that changes in the availability of US Federal aid have a 
significant effect on the schooling enrollment of adults.  Bound and Turner (2002) find that the 
net effects of funding through the G.I. Bill led to substantial gains in the post-secondary 
educational attainment of World War II veterans, comparable to recent estimates of enrollment 
responses to changes in tuition rates.  Subsidies may be especially effective in enhancing the 
human capital investment by the poor. 
Our study also examines willingness to make investments in human capital for a family 
member.  In the experiment the identity of the family member is not restricted, but in practice 
subjects typically considered the education of a child in their household. For this decision, the 
effect of a decision-maker’s own risk and time preferences are likely to be less relevant.  The risk 
of failure then applies to others, and patience or future orientation may also be less critical when 
decisions are made for children or other family members. We find that in contrast to the decision 
to invest in one’s own education, risk attitudes do not contribute to the decision to invest in 
education for family members.   
Furthermore, in this situation borrowing constraints might become the most important 
issue for poor families, even when parents are fully cognizant of the importance of investing in 
the human capital of their children.  Empirical evidence that the rate of return to education is 
higher for low-income youth is consistent with binding liquidity or borrowing constraints for 
students or their parents. (See Keane 2002 for a discussion of the limitations of this evidence.)  
However, studies by Cameron and Heckman (1998), Keane and Wolpin (2001), and Keane 
(2002) produce structural estimates to suggest that borrowing constraints have had little effect on 
college attendance decisions. Human-capital accumulation prior to college age is seen as playing 
a much more important role. Thus, if schooling decisions come earlier in the family life cycle, 
these authors consider that government policies might have a major impact on the children of 
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poor families.  We find that the education level of parents is an important factor; women who 
have some post-secondary schooling are more likely than their peers to invest in human capital 
for a family member (see Table 9). 
 
3. Research Design and Methods 
This section describes the design and operational details of the laboratory experiment.  To 
maximize the policy relevance of the results, we recruited subjects from the population that the 
policy is designed to target.  Recruitment efforts were organized through YMCA and work 
recruitment centers, whose membership included many working poor. To advertise and recruit 
for the experiment, a brief notice was posted in low-income neighborhoods and distributed at 
community group meetings. No information about the purpose of the study was revealed; 
potential subjects were told only that they would be paid a $12 show-up fee, and would have the 
opportunity to earn more in the course of the 90-minute study.  Subjects volunteered for the 
experiment by calling ahead and agreeing to show up at a time and location identified by the 
experimenters. All of the experimental sessions were held in Montreal over a period of three 
weeks in November 2000. 
A total of 256 subjects participated; summary sample statistics are shown in Table 1, with 
comparisons to population groups.  Sixty-three percent had family income less than the Statistics 
Canada low-income cut-off (LICOs) for their family size and composition.5  Average total 
family income for the entire sample was approximately $22,500 CAD. Seventy-two percent of 
the subjects were labor market participants, either employed or unemployed. Two thirds of the 
subjects were women. Participants were far from uneducated.  On average, they reported 
completing 13 to 14 years of schooling; 78 percent held a high-school diploma, and 26 percent 
reported completing a university degree.6 Nor were the subjects without assets or access to 
capital markets: 26 percent owned a car, and 54 percent possessed a credit card.  A significant 
fraction planned for the future: 47 percent declared that they made regular contributions to a 
savings account, and 27 percent contributed to a retirement plan.     
                                                
5 The LICOs vary based on family size and location.  In 2000, for a family of four in an urban setting, the before-tax 
LICO was 24,565 (See Statistics Canada 2001 for details). 
6 Some participants who had not been targeted by the recruitment efforts were still able to learn about the 
experiment. Word of mouth about the experience and the potential for substantial sums of cash traveled fast. The 
largest group of unintended recruits was full-time students; the 31 students represent 12 percent of the total number 
of subjects. Care was taken to identify this subgroup separately in the analysis. 
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Table 1:  Sample and Population Characteristics, N=256 
 
 Population 
Mean 
Sample 
Mean 
Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Age 34.7a 33.71 10.43 17 70 
Male 0.447b 0.332 0.472 0 1 
Number of Children 1.102b,c 0.633 0.953 0 4 
      
Non-Labor Force* n/a 0.121 0.327 0 1 
Student 0.182a 0.121 0.327 0 1 
      
Schooling (years) n/a 13.60 2.81 3 16 
High School Diploma 0.796a 0.781 0.414 0 1 
University degree 0.308c 0.258 0.438 0 1 
      
Low Income (below 
100% LICO) 
0.231 0.629 0.449 0 1 
*Main activity is housework or taking care of family 
 n/a: not available 
aPopulation of the city of Montreal. 
bPoor population in Montreal. 
cAuthors’ estimate based on census data. 
 
3.1 Procedure 
Once all participants were assembled for a session, subjects were given a $12 show-up 
fee, and the potential for additional earnings was explained and demonstrated.  Subjects 
completed the two components of the study, each of which was contained in a booklet for ease of 
administration and record keeping.  One booklet contained 64 experimental decisions, and the 
other contained 43 questions collecting demographic and household information.  Every effort 
was made to make the experiment accessible and non-threatening to all of the subjects. No 
computers were used, and simple devices like bingo balls and dice were used to generate random 
draws. Special attention was paid to the visual presentation and design of the incentivized 
decisions.  To ensure comprehension, a short set of practice decisions was incorporated into the 
instruction portion of the session. An example of each type of decision and the random draw 
process used to determine payment was illustrated in a six-decision practice. Instructions for the 
experiment are detailed in Appendix A.  In the debriefing questionnaire, 95 percent of the 
subjects indicated that they were confident they would be paid in the way that was described to 
them in the experiment.  
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At the end of the experiment one of the 64 experimental decisions was selected for 
payment using a bingo cage containing 64 balls, numbered 1 to 64. The number on the ball 
drawn from the cage identified the decision for which they would be paid.  If the decision 
involved a monetary prize on the same day of the experiment, the prize was given in cash, on 
site.  Delayed payments for the time-preference task were mailed in the form of a post-dated 
check for the date indicated in the experimental decision (2-28 days from the experiment). There 
were other forms of remuneration for the investment decisions, such as reimbursable educational 
expenses for own education and guaranteed investment certificates (GICs) for education for a 
family member.  (A description of all forms of remuneration can be found in Appendix A.) 
When the prize was a GIC, the experimenter signed an IOU and the prize was delivered to the 
subject by courier approximately one month after the experiment. All participants were required 
to sign a receipt. The average payoff per participant resulting from the experiment was 
approximately $137 in addition to a $12 show up fee.  Each experimental session, from 
instruction to payoff, took about an hour and a half. 
 
3.2 Experimental Decisions 
The incentivized decisions were designed to address three main questions:  (1) Will the 
working poor invest in human capital? (2) Are these subjects willing to delay consumption for 
substantial returns? (3) How do these subjects view risky choices? Thus three sets of decisions 
were used to investigate these questions: (1) investment preferences, (2) time preferences, and 
(3) risk preferences.   
3.2.1. Investment decisions.  Two sets of decisions involving human capital were 
available to the participants: Investment in their own human capital, and/or or investment in a 
family member’s human capital.7 Table 2 summarizes the human capital investment decisions. 
Each row of the table represents the alternatives presented to the subjects. Three decisions 
involve tradeoffs between cash and amounts earmarked for own education; three involve similar 
tradeoffs for a family member’s education.  A final decision compares the two.8   
 
                                                
7 Albrecht et al (in press) examine neurological differences in brain function for decisions for self and decisions for 
others.  
8 Note the full survey included decisions about retirement and durable goods investment that are not analyzed here.  
See Eckel, et al. (2005), for an analysis of the retirement decisions. 
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Table 2: Summary Description of Investment Decisions 
Decision 
Number 
Cash ($) (One Week From 
Today) 
Own Education 
($) 
Education of Family 
Member ($) 
1 100 200  
2 100  600 
3 100 600  
4 166  500 
5 100 400  
6 250  500 
7  500 500 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the way in which choices were presented to the subjects using one 
experimental decision.  There were three versions of this decision, with $200, $400, and $600 for 
investment in education weighted against an offer of $100 cash (one week from the day the 
experimental session was conducted). 
Figure 1: Sample Investment Decision 
You must choose A or B: 
Ø Choice A: $100 one week from today 
Ø Choice B: $400 in your own training or education 
 
These two choices are represented by the two following pictures. 
Please circle your choice: 
 
$100 one week from today 
 
 
 
 
 
O
or 
$400 in your own training or 
education 
 
(expenses refunded) 
 
  
 
Choice A 
 
Choice B 
 
The investment decisions were designed to test the subjects’ willingness to give up a 
$100 (one week from today) for reimbursable expenses for own education in the near term.   For 
a family member’s education, a different procedure was used.  Five-year, fixed, non-transferable 
Guaranteed Income Certificates (GICs) issued in the name of a family member were offered to 
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subjects as a mechanism for such an investment.  The lowest initial purchase of these GICs 
available at the time of the experiment was $500. Therefore to produce match rates similar to 
those for the own-education decisions and keep the participant payoffs within the limited budget 
of the experiment, the size of the cash alternative was varied.  The match rates were chosen to 
help pinpoint optimal match rates for the policy design.  
While it would more closely mimic the proposed policy to have subjects invest their own 
funds in exchange for an amount earmarked for education, that requirement would have made 
the administrative cost and timing of the laboratory experiment infeasible. The laboratory 
alternative to having subjects invest their own funds was to give subjects the choice between 
$100 in cash provided by the experimenter and a specified amount in education expenses. In this 
context, in order to select the educational outcome, subjects would have to give up $100 in cash. 
Given the range of the subjects’ incomes, $100 represented a substantial amount of money to 
them.   
Aggregate results for the investment decisions are shown in Table 3.  The first section 
indicates the percentage of subjects who chose $200, $400, or $600 earmarked for their own 
educational expenses over $100 cash one week from the date of the experiment. These choices 
represent match rates for education of 1/1, 3/1 and 5/1.  At the lowest matching rate of 1/1, the 
price of education is $0.50, and 22.9 percent of the participants chose education over cash. When 
subjects faced a 3/1 subsidy, the price of education is $0.25, and 43.8 percent of subjects chose 
education.  Even at the highest matching rate of 5 to 1, that is a price of $0.167, only 54.6 
percent of participants chose own educational expenses.9  The take-up rate for investment for a 
family member’s education was a similarly modest 47.9 percent.  
Except for the Student subgroup, in which the rates of choosing education are, not 
surprisingly, consistently higher for all match rates, the patterns of behavior observed in other 
population subgroups are similar to the overall population. Comparing women and men, men 
appear to be more sensitive to the matching rate than the women, starting off with a lower 
percentage of take-up for the 1/1 match rate (20.7 percent vs. 24.1 percent) and ending with a 
                                                
9 Because this choice entails giving up money they would otherwise receive from participating in the experiment — 
i.e. “house money” — rather than their own earned income, these results most likely overstate slightly the 
willingness of participants to forego current income for investment in human capital.  If participants had to use their 
own funds and give up planned consumption to do so, one would expect the take-up rate to be lower.  Note that the 
tradeoff ratios differ between own and family member because of constraints on the available financial instrument, 
in addition to a small calculation error in the design parameters. 
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higher take-up rate for the 5/1 match rate (57.3 percent vs. 53.2 percent). Low-income subjects, 
shown here as those with incomes less that 120 percent of the relevant LICO, do not differ 
significantly from the overall response levels (72 percent of the sample fell into this category).   
Table 3: Percent Choosing Education 
 
 Choosing education over cash Own over 
Family  Own Education Education of a family member 
Price of education: $.50 $.25 $.17 $.50 $.33 $.17 $1 
Men 20.7 42.7 57.3 23.1 37.2 46.2 64.7 
Women 24.1 44.3 53.2 25.0 35.4 48.8 52.6 
Labor Force 21.6 42.1 54.0 22.4 34.5 47.1 60.0 
Non-labor force 24.1 41.4 51.7 53.3 63.3 73.3 25.8 
Student 34.6 61.5 69.2 9.7 22.6 29.0 71.0 
Income below 120% 
of LICO 
21.6 41.5 53.2 28.3 38.2 49.7 54.6 
Total 22.9 43.8 54.6 24.4 36.0 47.9 56.6 
 
The second section of Table 3 represents the percentage of subjects who chose amounts 
earmarked for educational expenses of a family member over variable cash amounts one week 
from the date of the experiment. Here the matching rates are 1/1, 2/1, and 5/1.  In the lowest 
subsidy rate offered, participants were asked to choose between $250 cash a week from the day 
of the experiment and a GIC with a $500 deposit value bearing interest with a fixed maturity of 
five years. If this certificate of deposit was won, the winning participant had to identify the 
bearer (family member recipient) on the day of the experiment. It was emphasized by the 
experimenter that those certificates were to be used for the education of a family member.   
Overall, when the price of education is $0.50, 24.4 percent of all participants chose the family 
member’s education over cash; at a lower price of $0.33, 36.0 percent chose the family member 
education, and at the lowest price of $0.17, 47.9 percent chose family member education. 
Similar results hold for the Low Income subpopulation.  However, for the participants 
declaring their main activity to be taking care of their family, these proportions are substantially 
higher at 53.3 percent, 63.3 percent, and 73.3 percent, respectively. This observation requires a 
deeper look. A substantially smaller proportion of the Non-labor Force subpopulation chose 
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education for themselves when faced with the same high and low match rates (24.1 percent at a 
price of $.50 and 51.7 percent at a price of $.17).  
In the last column of Table 3, proportions are summarized for the choice between $500 
for their own education and $500 for a family member’s education. Here, the non-labor force 
participants overwhelmingly choose their payoff in the form of family member’s education. All 
other subgroups choose their own education more often. It may be that members of this 
subpopulation consider an investment in education to be a better investment for family members 
than for themselves. Further analysis of family member education is undertaken below. 
3.2.2. Time preference decisions.  Time preferences were elicited by giving subjects a 
series of choices between a smaller sooner payment (SS) and a larger amount later (LL). If the 
subject chose LL, the subject was rewarded for waiting. Thirty-seven decisions were constructed, 
varying the timing of the sooner payment (front end delay, FED = 0, 1, 7 or 14 days), the 
investment period (2-28 days), and the rate of return (10%, 50%, 200%, or 380%).10 Simple 
interest rates were used for simplicity, given the low education level of the subject pool.  The 
longest time period was not included in the set of decisions with a 380% return for budgetary 
reasons.  The SS payments were approximately $72, with one set of decisions at a lower SS of 
approximately $26.  The decisions were presented to the subjects in random order.  The full set 
of decisions is presented in Appendix B Table B.1. The proportion of impatient decisions for 
each is presented in Appendix C, Table C.3.  These responses can be used to measure the overall 
degree of patience.11  
Subjects were, overall, quite impatient.  Five percent of participants (13 subjects) 
exhibited the most patient behavior by always choosing the later payment, while fifteen percent 
(43 subjects) chose the earliest payoff regardless of payoff, discount rates, or time delays. Figure 
2 shows the proportion of subjects making impatient decisions by rate of return and investment 
period.  Overall the fraction choosing the earlier decision falls with higher rates of return, as 
expected.  For the 10% and 50% rates of return, impatient behavior increases slightly with the 
                                                
10 Note at the rate of return of 380%, we utilized only one FED of one day, and were no 28-day investment-period 
decisions.  This decision was made to limit the number of 380% decisions for cost considerations.  See Appendix B 
for the full set of decisions.   
11 Since this experiment was conducted (in November 2000), alternative time-preference elicitation methods have 
been developed and used by other researchers, including Harrison, et al., (2002); Anderson et al., (2006); et al., 
(2009). The task used here was developed by the authors, and was among the first attempts to elicit time preference 
in non-student populations.  In subsequent studies, we and others have found that more consistent choices are made 
when decisions are presented to subjects in a coherent structure, rather than our approach. 
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investment period; for 200% it says roughly constant for different investment periods; for 380% 
there is a slight decrease in impatient behavior with longer investment periods.   
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Impatient Choices 
 
In sum, 20 percent of the subjects were not affected by the parameters of the experiment: a 
380 percent rate of return was not enough to induce 15 percent of the sample to save, and a 10 
percent rate of return was not too low to discourage 5 percent of the sample to save, even for two 
days. On the other hand, at least eighty percent of the subjects were affected by the parameters of the 
experiment, and made decisions that varied with parameter levels.  Table 4 contains the results of a 
linear regression that shows the effect of the rate of return, investment period and absolute return on 
the proportion of subjects who choose the sooner payment for each decision. It also includes a 
variable “today” that is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the sooner payment was the day of the 
experiment (FED = 0).  Note the dependent variable in this regression is the percent of subjects who 
choose the impatient alternative, and therefore there are 37 observations, one for each binary 
decision.  Controlling for other factors, the longer the subject had to wait between the earlier and 
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later payoff dates, the more chose the earlier date.  A higher rate of return as well as a higher 
absolute dollar return induced more subjects to wait for the higher, later amount.  Finally, the 
“today” variable carries an insignificant sign, which indicates that subjects were not more likely to 
take a payoff in hand on the day of the experiment.  This is encouraging, as it indirectly implies that 
skepticism about whether future payoffs would be paid was not a factor in the present-orientation of 
the decisions: subjects trusted the experimenters to pay the promised amounts on the promised dates.   
Table 4: Factors Affecting the Percentage of Participants Choosing the Earliest Payoff 
Choices for Each Time Preference Decision (Logistic Specification, n=37 for 37 binary 
decisions) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.968 *** 8.06 
Investment Perioda 0.0414 *** 4.69 
Todayb 0.139  0.85 
Absolute Returnc -0.137 *** -6.09 
Rate of Returnd -0.002 *** -4.80 
2R = 0.817; 37 observations. Bolded values and *** indicate coefficients statistically significant on the 0.1 percent level.  
Marginal effects at mean values are respectively: 0.0099, 0.033, -0.033, -0.00053.  
aInvestment Period is the number of days between the early payoff and later payoff. 
bToday is 1 if payoff is the day of the survey; 0 otherwise. 
cAbsolute Return is the absolute difference between payoffs (Later Payoff - Early Payoff). 
dRate of Return is the annualized rate of return for waiting for later payoff. 
 (See Appendix B, Table B.1 for a summary of the time preference decisions.) 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the response to the different interest rates is most distinct for the 
14 day investment period, and it is this set of decisions we use to construct a time preference 
measure for the analysis of investment decisions below. Evidence shows that varying FED and 
investment period (t) can affect the elicited discount rate (see Coller and Williams, 1999). For 
the most part, we control for this by only using 4 decisions (12, 10, 21, and 1, Appendix B Table 
B.1).  All four decisions have an investment period of 14 days and range in delayed payoffs from 
10% to 380%. Decisions for the 10%, 50%, and 200% rates of return have a FED of 7 days, 
whereas the decision for 380% return has a FED of only 1 day. (It is the longest FED we have in 
our decision set for a payoff of 380% and a 14-day investment period.)  Twenty-four participants 
(9.4%) exhibited inconsistent behavior (choosing not to save at high interest rates when choosing 
to save at lower rates) and were dropped from subsequent analysis.   
We use these decisions to categorize participants into one of five groups; the groupings 
imply restrictions on individual discount rates (using simple interest to avoid complication). 
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Intervals are used rather than values because of the limited number of rates of return in the 
experiment. We construct a set of five dummy variables to use in subsequent analysis. These 
dummies do not impose a particular functional structure on time preferences.12 Patient at 10, 50, 
200, 380, and Patient never dummy variables are defined in the following manner, and imply 
distinct ranges of Individual Discount Rates (IDR) as shown: 
Patient at 10 = 1 Saved for all four decisions IDR < 10% 
Patient at 50 = 1 Saved for three decisions with interest ≥ 50 10% ≤  IDR ≤ 50% 
Patient at 200 = 1 Saved for two decisions with interest rate ≥  200% 50% < IDR ≤ 200% 
Patient at 380 = 1 Saved for one decision with interest rate = 380% 200% < IDR ≤ 380% 
Patient never = 1 Did not save for any decision  IDR > 380% 
  While these discount rates are elicited over short time periods and appear high in 
absolute terms, we show in Eckel et al. (2005) that they are strongly correlated with discount 
rates measured over longer periods.  Thus the dummy variables accurately capture relative 
differences across subjects in long-term discount rates and are used in the regression analysis 
below.   
3.2.3. Risk Preference Decisions.  Risk tolerance was elicited using 14 pairs of lottery 
choices presented to the subjects in random order as shown in Table 6 below.  The notation ($X; 
Y) means that X dollars is offered with probability Y; for example, in Decision 1, the participant 
is asked to choose between Option A yielding a certain $40, and Option B yielding a 50 percent 
chance of winning $90.  The first 5 decisions involve a certain amount compared to a 50/50 
gamble: for Decisions 2-5 the certain amount is equal to the expected value of the gamble.  
Decisions 6-11 also involve a choice between a certain amount and a gamble, varying 
probabilities from 50/50.  Decisions 12-14 involve a choice between gambles.  Through these 
choices, subjects revealed their preference for risk.  This series of decisions with various payoffs 
and levels of risk can be used to explore the risk aversion of the participants.13  
                                                
12  Eckel et al (2001) includes regression analysis including all time preferences decisions by all participants. Using 
all decisions instead of the five created dummies does not change the results but requires the use of inconsistent 
decisions and imposes a particular functional structure on the time preferences. 
13 Since this study was completed, a number of researchers have developed and tested tasks eliciting risk 
preferences.  See for example, Holt and Laury (2002), Anderson et al. (2006), Eckel and Grossman (2008), Charness 
and Gneezy (2010). 
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Table 5: Summary Description of the Risk-Preference Decisions 
  Lotteries 
Decision Order Less Risky Alternative More Risky Alternative 
1 49 ($40; 1.00) ($90; 0.50) or ($0; 0.50) 
2 46 ($60; 1.00) ($80; 0.50) or ($40; 0.50) 
3 38 ($60; 1.00) ($120; 0.50) or ($0; 0.50) 
4 47 ($80; 1.00) ($100; 0.50) or ($60; 0.50) 
5 39 ($100; 1.00) ($200; 0.50) or ($0; 0.50) 
6 40 ($60; 1.00) ($240; 0.25) or ($0; 0.75) 
7 42 ($60; 1.00) ($80; 0.75) or ($0; 0.25) 
8 50 ($75; 1.00) ($275; 0.30) or ($0; 0.70) 
9 41 ($100; 1.00) ($400; 0.25) or ($0; 0.75) 
10 43 ($100; 1.00) ($133.33; 0.75) or ($0; 0.25) 
11 48 ($120; 1.00) ($175; 0.80) or ($0; 0.20) 
12 45 ($100; 0.40 or ($0; 0.60) ($400; 0.10) or ($0; 0.90) 
13 44 ($100; 0.50) or ($0; 0.50) ($200; 0.25) or ($0; 0.75) 
14 51 ($120; 0.50) or ($0; 0.50) ($175; 0.40) or ($0; 0.60) 
Notes: The notation ($X; Y) means that X dollars is offered with probability Y. The three pairs of 
decisions, (5, 13), (9, 12) and (11, 14), are common-ratio lotteries. 
 
In Table 6, we show how the behavior of the participants, as described by a value between 0 
and 14, was affected by the difference in the coefficient of variation (standard error/mean) between a 
pair of lotteries (the risk variable).   Note the dependent variable in this regression is the percent of 
subjects who choose the less risky alternative, and therefore there are 14 observations, one for each 
binary decision.  The coefficient of variation is a measure of the riskiness of the lottery. (See Weber, 
et al., 2004 for a discussion of the validity of this measure).   
Table 6: The Risk Factor Affecting the Percentage of Participants Choosing the Less Risky 
Lotteries for Each Risk Preference Decision (Logistic Specification) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.502 *** 3.57 
Riska 1.194 *** 2.96 
2R = 0.3731; 14 observations 
________________________________________________________ 
 *** indicate coefficients statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. Marginal effect at mean values: 0.251. 
a Risk is the difference in the coefficients of variation (standard error/mean) between a pair of lotteries. A higher value of 
Risk means a higher difference in the level of risk between a pair of lotteries.   
 (See Table 6 for a summary of the risk preference decisions.) 
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For the analysis below, we define the variable RISK AVERSE, which takes a value of one if 
subjects chose the safe option for at least 70 % of the risk decisions and a value of zero 
otherwise.  This classifies 61% of our subjects as “risk averse”.14   
3.3 Survey  
After making the incentivized decisions, the subjects completed a 43-question survey (ID 
numbers were used to link the survey and experimental decisions). The survey was designed 
with two purposes in mind. The first aim was to collect standard demographic information (such 
as sex, income, education, and main activity) to control for obvious socioeconomic differences in 
the sample. The second motivation was to collect survey-based measures of preferences and self-
reported behavior to compare with the experimental measures. These measures included 
subjects’ self-perceived patience, risk aversion, locus of control, and savings behavior.  The full 
set of questions is contained in Appendix A.   
 
4. Results: 
Will the working poor respond to incentives to invest in human capital? In this study, the 
decision to invest is represented by a choice to forego a cash option offered by the experimenter 
in favor of an option to invest in one’s own human capital or a family member’s education. This 
section reports regression analysis of the investment decision, taking into account factors that 
may influence an individual’s preference for assets. Demographic, behavioral, attitudinal, and 
treatment variables are considered.  
4.1 Analysis of investment in one’s own human capital 
Consider four categories of investment preference for human capital: no preference for 
investment, some preference for investment, strong preference for investment, and very strong 
preference for investment. The latent variable *iIE captures the preference of individual i  to 
invest in his or her own education. The following ordered probit has been estimated using a 
                                                
14 Note because of the structure of our risky decisions, we are unable to estimate a “state of the art” measure of risk 
aversion, such as the coefficient of relative risk aversion (e.g., Holt and Laury 2002).  There is too little variation in 
the range of payoffs and the probability of winning the higher prize.   
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number of demographic and behavioral characteristics: iii XIE εβ +=
* .  Variable definitions and 
descriptive statistics are included in Appendix B and C.   
The preference for human capital investment is not directly observed, but rather we 
observe whether the subjects have chosen education when faced with three different trade-offs 
between cash and educational expenses.  As a reminder, each subject made three choices during 
the experiment: $100 in cash vs. $200 in educational expenses, $100 in cash vs. $400 in 
educational expenses, and $100 in cash vs. $600 in educational expenses. Let the observed 
counterpart of the latent variable *iIE  be defined as: 0=iIE  if a participant never chose 
education for any trade-off; 1=iIE  if education was chosen when $600 was offered in 
educational expenses (1 to 5 match rate); 2=iIE  if education was chosen by the participant 
when at least $400 was offered in educational expenses (at least a 1 to 3 match rate); and finally, 
3=iIE  if education was always the revealed choice of the participant for any offer of 
educational expenses. Assuming the error term is standard normally distributed, ( )1,0~ Niε   then 
the probabilities y of participant i never choosing education, choosing education only once (at 
the 1 to 5 match rate), twice (when at least a 1 to 3 match rate is offered) and always choosing 
education are easily obtained as well as the corresponding likelihood function. 
The estimation results for the ordered probit are reported in Table 7. Greater patience 
results in a greater probability of choosing education over cash: at each discount rate level 
(indicated by the Patient variables defined above) the probability of choosing education over 
cash increases.  This is true for all except the highest discount rate category; Patient Never is the 
omitted category. This is consistent with the theory of human capital, as discussed in the 
introduction above.  More risk-averse subjects show a lower probability of investing in human 
capital.15  As was discussed in section 2, for the adult population in our sample, risk aversion 
implies a greater preference for the status quo, i.e., remaining in the workforce rather than 
investing in additional human capital.  Many of the subjects in this experiment are likely to have 
endured failures in the labor market, school, and other situations. Investing in human capital 
carries a risk that they may want to avoid in order to steer clear of another possibility of failure. 
Table 7: Determinants of Choosing Educational Expenses Over Cash 
                                                
15 Interestingly, Dohmen, et al. (2010) found that lower cognitive ability is associated with greater risk aversion, and 
more pronounced impatience.  Burks et al. (2009) find a similar result. 
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(Ordered Probit, 219 Observations) 
Variable names Coefficients     (t-statistics) 
Patient at 10 1.07 *** 
 3.80  
Patient at 50 0.99 *** 
 3.27  
Patient at 200 0.72 *** 
 3.11  
Patient at 380 0.27  
 1.21  
Risk Averse  -1.44 ** 
 -2.54  
Age -0.04 *** 
 -3.05  
Risk Averse x Age 0.03 * 
 1.86  
Male 0.03  
 0.18  
Number Children 0.01  
 0.16  
Income Below LICO 120 0.07  
 0.36  
Student 0.27  
 0.82  
Labor Force 0.29  
 1.15  
Constant -1.35 ** 
 -1.77  
δ1 0.30 *** 
 4.94  
δ2 0.93 *** 
  9.24   
Log likelihood -248.33  
Restricted Log Likelihood -272.57   
T-statistics are below each coefficient in parentheses. Bolded values indicate coefficients 
statistically significant on the 10 percent level, * indicates a 5 percent level, ** indicates 
a 1 percent level, and *** indicates a 0.1 percent level. 
Sample size of 219 resulted from 24 subjects dropped because of inconsistent time 
preference decisions and additional 13 subjects dropped because of inconsistent own 
education decisions. The results when dropping the 25 students from the regression are 
the same (results available upon request). 
 
Older persons are more likely to choose the cash alternative to education financing, 
reflecting the smaller time period available for recouping their investment in human capital. The 
effects of sex, number of children, and income levels are insignificant; that is, these factors (and 
in particular cash constraints) do not enter directly into the determination of the investment in 
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human capital.  It is important to note that, by design, many of the subjects were below or near 
the LICOs and this result may simply indicate that individuals near the LICOs, whether above or 
below, act in a similar manner.  
The choice of education over cash is significantly related to patience, and to risk 
aversion, especially when it is interacted with age. The other demographic and behavioral 
variables are not significantly related to the decision to choose cash over education, and their 
addition does not change the pattern of results observed here.    
Finally, and most importantly, the ordered probit threshold parameters δ1 and δ2 indicate 
whether the different match rates affect the probability of investment in education at each level 
of subsidy.  Positive, statistically significant coefficients indicate that different match rates 
offered to subjects induce different response rates, with higher subsidies producing larger 
responses.  
In Table 8, we have computed the predicted probability for each individual to be in each 
of the four categories of behavior (Never, Once, Twice, Always Chose Educational Expenses 
over cash), based on the regression model above. For a specific characteristic, (Gender, income, 
etc.) an average conditional probability for each was computed.16  
These results show that the level of impatience and the interplay between age and attitude 
towards risk both play an important role in the human capital investment decision. Note the 
dramatic change in the probability of investment from subjects who exhibited the most patient 
behavior (Patient at 10) to subjects who exhibited the most impatient behavior (Never Patient) 
for the extreme investment preference category of Never. On average, 65 percent of the least 
patient subjects never chose to invest in education compared with only 24 percent of the most 
patient subjects. To a lesser degree than impatience, attitude towards risk coupled with age is 
also an important factor in the investment decision. On average, 57 percent of the more risk 
averse and older subjects never choose educational expenses over cash whereas only 27 percent 
of the young and risk accepting subjects exhibit this tendency. The younger, risk accepting 
subjects are also far more likely to always choose educational expenses. On average 41 percent 
choose educational expenses in all cases when offered in the experiment whereas their older and 
risk averse counterparts exhibited this behavior only 15 percent of the time.  
                                                
16 The significant variables in the ‘never’ and ‘always’ categories also carry relatively large marginal effects. Note 
that in an ordered probit the signs of the interior marginal effects are unknown and not completely determined by the 
sign of the coefficient estimates. Results are available upon request. 
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Table 8: Fitted Distribution of Number of Times Subject Chooses Education over Cash  
 
	  	   Never Once	   Twice	   Always	  
Variable	  name	   Pr (IFi = 0) Pr (IFi = 1) Pr (IFi = 2) Pr (IFi = 3) 
Patient	  at	  10	  (most	  patient)	   0.24	   0.09	   0.23	   0.44	  
Patient	  at	  50	  	   0.27	   0.10	   0.24	   0.39	  
Patient	  at	  200	   0.34	   0.11	   0.23	   0.32	  
Patient	  at	  380	  	   0.53	   0.11	   0.19	   0.17	  
Patient	  never	  (least	  patient)	   0.65	   0.10	   0.15	   0.10	  
Risk	  averse	  &	  age>=40	   0.57	   0.10	   0.18	   0.15	  
Risk	  averse	  &	  age<40	   0.55	   0.11	   0.18	   0.16	  
Non	  risk	  averse	  	  &	  age>=40	   0.49	   0.10	   0.20	   0.21	  
Non	  risk	  averse	  &	  age<40	   0.27	   0.09	   0.23	   0.41	  
Male	   0.47	   0.10	   0.20	   0.23	  
Female	   0.48	   0.10	   0.19	   0.23	  
No	  children	   0.46	   0.10	   0.20	   0.24	  
Has	  children	   0.49	   0.10	   0.19	   0.22	  
Low	  Income	   0.49	   0.10	   0.19	   0.22	  
Above	  low	  Income	   0.44	   0.10	   0.20	   0.26	  
Student	   0.32	   0.10	   0.22	   0.36	  
Labor	  Force	   0.48	   0.10	   0.20	   0.22	  
Other	  main	  activities	   0.53	   0.10	   0.17	   0.20	  
All	   0.47	   0.10	   0.20	   0.23	  
 
The results summarized in the last row of the table “All” compare directly to the aggregate 
results. These average probabilities are unconditional on specific characteristics of participants 
and show the influence of the match rates through the threshold parameters δ1 and δ2. The values 
for the unconditional probabilities “All” are interesting in themselves. Participants interested in 
post secondary education are more likely to choose the education subsidy more than just once in 
the experiment.  
 
Lastly, it is interesting to note that the standard deviations (not shown) are very low in 
columns 2 and 3 relative to columns 1 and 4 for each conditional characteristic. This suggests 
that the incentive effects of the match rates are very strong, as participants as a group, respond to 
changes in the generosity of the incentive.  
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4.2 Analysis of investment in family member’s education 
This section focuses on the preference to invest in the education of a family member. Just 
as the investment decision was modeled above, the latent variable, *iIF , of the following ordered 
probit captures the preference of individual i  to invest in a family member’s education.  
The observed counterpart of the latent variable *iIF  is defined as follows: 0=iIF  if a 
participant never chose education for a family member for any trade-off offered; 1=iIF  if 
education was chosen when $600 was offered in educational expenses (1 to 5 match rate); 
2=iIF  if education was chosen by the participant when at least a 1 to 3 match rate was offered 
(that is $500 in education vs. $166 cash or $600 in education vs. $100 cash); and, finally, 3=iIF  
if education was always the revealed choice of the participant for any offer of educational 
expenses. 
The ordered probit (Table 9) was estimated using a number of demographic and 
behavioral characteristics as independent variables.   As with the previous regression, the results 
show again that the threshold parameters are statistically significant and positive, indicating that 
subjects are responsive to the “price” of saving for human capital. The number of children 
strongly affects this decision; people with children are substantially more likely to choose 
education of a family member, supporting our intuition that most subjects intended to use it as 
such. Another positive indicator of preference for investment in a family member’s education 
was belonging to a community group, a measure of the subjects’ connectedness to the 
neighborhood.  The interaction of Male with years of schooling (Yrs School x Male) carries a 
negative coefficient, indicating that men with more schooling are actually more likely to choose 
cash over investment in a family member’s education.17 
 
Table 9: Determinants of Choosing Education of a Family Member Over Cash  
(Ordered Probit, 220 Observations) 
 
                                                
17 In the regressions in tables 7 and 9, the core experimental variables are the same in both specifications 
(impatience and risk), but we have retained different characteristics and socioeconomics variables as the dependent 
variables differ. The specifications were inspired from the literature and from various essays in both specifications. 
We have tried to be parsimonious, but we kept some non-significant variables nevertheless that we considered 
interesting.   
 
 
 
25 
Variables names Coefficients     (t-statistics) 
Patient at 10 0.77 ** 
 2.54 
Patient at 50 0.67 ** 
 2.28 
Patient at 200 0.66 *** 
 2.77 
Patient at 380 0.08 
 0.36 
Risk Averse  -0.79 
 -1.33 
Age 0.00 
 -0.01 
Risk Averse x Age 0.02 
 0.97 
Male 1.35 
 1.27 
Number Children 0.35 *** 
 3.68 
Income Below LICO 120 0.10 
 0.50 
Student -0.55 ** 
 -2.06 
Locusa -0.39 
 -1.26 
Male x Locus 0.14 
 0.90 
Yrs Schoolb -0.04 
 -0.44 
Male x Yrs School -0.13 ** 
 -1.99 
Yrs School x Locus 0.02 
 1.06 
Local Community Organizationc 0.42 
 1.61 
Constant -0.32 
 -0.22 
δ1 0.35 *** 
 5.31 
δ2 0.79 *** 
  8.11  
Log likelihood -232.43  
Restricted Log Likelihood -258.60  
T-statistics are below each coefficient in parentheses. Bolded values indicate coefficients 
statistically significant on the 10 percent level, * indicates a 5 percent level, ** indicates 
a 1 percent level, and *** indicates a 0.1 percent level. 
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Sample size of 220 resulted from 24 subjects dropped because of inconsistent time 
preference decisions and additional 12 subjects dropped because of inconsistent family 
member education decisions. When dropping the students from the regression, the results 
remain the same (results available upon request). 
aLocus of Control is the Locus of Control index (0–7). A lower value indicates that the 
subject has strong feelings of self-efficacy. (Internal = 0, External =7) 
b Yrs School is the number of years of schooling.  
cFor Local Community Organization a value of 1 indicates participants associated with; 0 
if no affiliation. The membership of this group was almost exclusively Black. This is the 
closest approximation to a variable of visible minority status with the existing data. 
 
 
The time preference measures enter the explanation for saving for a family member’s 
education much in the same way they helped explain some of the variation in investing in one’s 
own education. More patient participants are more likely to choose a family member’s education 
over a cash alternative. However, contrary to the previous ordered probit regression, attitude 
toward risk does not play a role in the choice to save for a family member’s education. This is in 
accordance with the interpretation given earlier to this variable with respect to investing in one’s 
own education: the education of a family member does not create a risky situation for the 
subject, as such. 
In Table 10 the estimated probabilities of investing in education of a family member for 
different subgroups are summarized.18 Note the differences in probabilities for saving for a 
family member’s education for subjects who exhibited relatively impatient behavior (Never 
Patient). Those individuals were far less likely to invest in family member’s education. Even 
when the match rate was most favorable, 1 to 5, on average 63 percent of the least patient 
subjects chose cash over the investment option. On average, only about 16 percent of the least 
patient would choose the investment option when their contribution would be matched at 100 
percent (1 to 1).  The results of the last line, “All,” are unconditional on specific characteristics 
of participants and show the influence of the threshold parameters or match rates. As before, the 
standard deviations (not shown) of these estimated probabilities in columns two and three in 
Table 10 below are quite low, indicating the responsiveness of the participants to the different 
levels of subsidy.  
Table 10: Fitted Distribution of Choosing Education of a Family Member over Cash.   
  Never Once Twice Always 
  Pr (IEi = 0) Pr (IEi = 1) Pr (IEi = 2) Pr (IEi = 3) 
                                                
18 The significant variables in the ‘never’ and ‘always’ categories also carry relatively large marginal effects. Results 
are available upon request. 
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Patient at 10 0.40 0.12 0.15 0.33 
Patient at 50 0.42 0.13 0.15 0.30 
Patient at 200 0.40 0.12 0.15 0.33 
Patient at 380 0.62 0.11 0.11 0.16 
Patient never. 0.63 0.11 0.10 0.16 
Risk averse  & age>=40 0.45 0.12 0.15 0.28 
Risk averse  & age<40 0.63 0.11 0.10 0.16 
Non risk averse  & age>=40 0.41 0.12 0.15 0.32 
Non risk averse & age<40 0.45 0.12 0.14 0.29 
male 0.52 0.12 0.13 0.23 
female 0.54 0.11 0.12 0.23 
No children 0.62 0.11 0.11 0.16 
Has Children 0.37 0.12 0.15 0.36 
Low Income 0.51 0.12 0.13 0.24 
Above Income 0.59 0.11 0.12 0.18 
Student 0.68 0.10 0.10 0.12 
Labor force 0.53 0.12 0.13 0.22 
Others main activities 0.38 0.11 0.14 0.37 
Single parent 0.36 0.12 0.15 0.37 
Not single parent 0.57 0.12 0.12 0.19 
locus of control <5 0.53 0.11 0.13 0.23 
locus of control >=5 0.53 0.12 0.13 0.22 
Schooling (Years) <=10 0.43 0.10 0.13 0.34 
10< Schooling (Years) <=13 0.59 0.11 0.12 0.18 
Schooling (Years) >13 0.52 0.12 0.13 0.23 
Local Community Organization 0.33 0.11 0.14 0.42 
Other or No Local Comm Org 0.56 0.12 0.12 0.20 
All 0.53 0.11 0.13 0.23 
 
5. Validity 
Sixteen subjects of the 256 subjects received payment in the form of educational 
expenses.19 All sixteen subjects produced valid documentation to claim reimbursement for 
educational expenses within the specified time period of one year from the date of the 
experiment. This follow through gives an indication that subjects believed that they would be 
paid in the way described by the experimenters and made their decisions accordingly.  
                                                
19 There were 64 experimental decisions of which one was randomly chosen for payment. In order to receive 
payment in the form of educational expenses, a subject had to choose education expenses over the alternative 
offered and have that decision randomly chosen for payment. 
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This study was funded by the Social Research and Demonstration Corporation (SRDC) to 
provide input into the design of its field experiment testing the effect of subsidies to saving for 
education.  The results show how subjects respond in a laboratory setting, and indicate that 
higher subsidies are effective in inducing subjects to choose education over cash, our proxy for 
the decision in the field to save for investment in human capital.   
SRDC began implementation of the corresponding field experiment, the learn$ave 
project – a random-assignment demonstration project – shortly after completion of this study. 
learn$ave can be thought of as a pilot project for encouraging the working poor to save for post-
secondary education. Participants were recruited for an information session that describes the 
project and the odds of being randomly assigned to a treatment group or the control group. Those 
in the learn$ave treatment groups received various levels of post-secondary education expenses 
matched to personal saving levels, and some received financial counseling. The control group 
was surveyed, but enjoyed none of the benefits of the treatment group. Generally speaking, with 
most random assignment projects, volunteers are randomly assigned into treatment groups and a 
control group after the information session. SRDC assigned volunteers to treatment groups that 
varied by province, match rate and financial counseling. As part of the implementation, SRDC 
conducted 36 focus groups on participants and non-participants across Canada. Of the project 
participants, separate focus groups were formed of those who saved regularly and those who did 
not save regularly. Their findings, published in the implementation report (Kingwell et al, 2005) 
are strongly similar to our results and provide support for the validity of laboratory experiments 
in parameterizing policies. We highlight some of those similarities. 
We can compare the subjects in our experiment to the enrollees and non-participants in 
the learn$ave project. A majority of our experimental subjects had no knowledge about the 
education financing nature of the experimental choices until they arrived at the session. 
Therefore those subjects in our experiment who did not take up any education financing options 
can be compared to those that chose not to volunteer for learn$ave after they attended an 
information session. Those subjects that chose to take up education financing at different subsidy 
rates compare to those that that volunteered for learn$ave. 
The executive summary of SRDC’s Design and Implementation Report, concludes that  
learn$ave had much greater appeal for certain groups within the low-income population. 
Those who were ready for the changes in their lives that could be facilitated by 
participating in learn$ave and who were in a position to take advantage of these benefits 
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were more likely to apply. Recent immigrants were foremost in this category, as many of 
them already had high levels of formal education and they needed to obtain Canadian 
credentials.  In addition, learn$ave was of interest to Canadians who were more likely 
than the general eligible population to be younger, single, well educated, and employed. 
 
In our study, we found that younger, more educated and those engaged in the labor market were 
more likely to take up subsidized investment for educational expenses.  
Of the learn$ave non-volunteers, there were many perceived barriers to participating. 
Some said that the investment period was too long. Some said the cap was too low to make the 
effort worthwhile.20 Some simply procrastinated in turning in their paperwork (SRDC, 2005 pp. 
103-107). These barriers can be captured in terms of time preference. In this experimental study, 
over 80 percent of the variation in the responses to the time preference decisions is explained by 
investment period, rate of return, and the absolute return, in the same directions found by the 
focus groups.  Those in the experiment that were highly impatient were far less likely to take up 
any investment in human capital.   
Most interestingly, the SRDC report highlights personality differences but not observable 
differences between regular and irregular savers. For example, regular savers are forward-
looking, are committed to make personal sacrifices, have a clear investment goal, have strong 
savings attitudes, and are self-disciplined. However, both regular and irregular savers cited low 
wages, unstable work or income and loss of employment as barriers to saving. Both lived 
through critical events, although regular savers were more able to protect savings in the face of 
such events. We have a strikingly similar result. We do not directly observe savings behavior in 
our experiment, but we do observe, through the investment decisions, who would be willing to 
forego near cash for future educational expense. The only visible characteristics listed in the 
regression summary in Table 10 that explain any of the variation in investment behavior is 
number of children. Our participants varied considerably in the degree of patience, and time 
preference, measured with incentivized decisions, enters strongly into the determination of 
probability of saving for a family member’s education as it does for saving for one’s own 
education.21  Time preference observations are not typically collected but can potentially explain 
much of the behavioral differences between participants in a program like learn$ave. 
                                                
20 The savings cap for a majority of learn$ave participants was $6000 with a  match rate of $3 for every $1 saved.  
21 Explanations have been given in the literature to explain differences from person to person (see Becker and 
Mulligan, 1997, for a review and discussion). 
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6. Summary and Conclusion 
This study makes use of methodology developed for lab experiments to measure 
preferences and choices of the target population of a proposed government policy. The 
experiment was initiated to inform the design of the Canadian learn$ave project, which was 
promoted to encourage low-income people to save money to invest in human capital.  In this 
section we summarize the main findings of the study and their implications for a policy designed 
to induce the poor to save for investment in human capital – for themselves and for family 
members.   
Based on the study’s results, we conclude that a sizable proportion of the working poor 
would invest in human capital if the investment were sufficiently subsidized. The more the 
investment was subsidized, the more likely individuals were to invest. When subjects were 
presented with the opportunity analogous to the learn$ave matching offer ($400 in educational 
expenses or $100 in cash), 44 percent of subjects accepted the offer of education, almost double 
the proportion of subjects willing to invest at the lower matching rate of 1/1.  Because these 
results entail giving up “house money” rather than their own earned income, they may slightly 
overstate subjects’ willingness to forego current income for an investment in education.22 Many 
of the subjects chose not to invest, even at the highest subsidy rate of 5/1:  At this rate, 45.4 did 
not invest in their own human capital, and 52.1 did not invest in a family member’s education.   
This study also has implications for programs designed to encourage saving more 
generally.  Many subjects were willing to delay consumption for substantial returns. Subjects 
were asked to choose between smaller payments sooner or larger payments later. For the 
participants in the study, choosing the larger payment later is analogous to saving. The subject 
must forego near-current consumption to receive future consumption. Delaying the sooner payoff 
– pushing it farther into the future – reduced the incentive to pick the later alternative even when 
the rate of return was held constant. More research is warranted, but these results suggest that 
savings programs that allow frequent withdrawals (to accelerate reward) and stress absolute 
difference in monetary gains as well as rate of return will fare better than those that do not. 
                                                
22 The house money effect hypothesizes that individuals take more risk with money they don’t yet consider to be 
their own. 
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When the stakes were high, subjects were quite risk averse. Because many low-income 
individuals, including a large fraction of our subjects, purchase lottery tickets, an action that is 
normally associated with risk-seeking attitudes, one might expect the poor to exhibit greater risk-
seeking behavior in lab-based decisions such as these.  The risk measures developed in this paper 
were not correlated with whether subjects bought lottery tickets, suggesting that attitudes toward 
risk might be more contextual than is often thought. In this experiment, the context of the 
monetary gambles offered as choices to the subjects had substantial stakes to be risked ($60 to 
$120) for modest gains. This is perhaps a better indicator of one’s risk aversion with regard to 
educational investment than the mere observation of behavior towards lottery ticket purchases.23  
Eliciting patience and risk aversion helps us to inform the larger question: Will the 
working poor respond to incentives to save to invest in human capital? The more patient 
participants were, the more likely they were to invest in their own education. The more risk-
averse subjects were, the less likely they were to invest in their own education. These subjects 
appear to view foregoing a certain cash in exchange for a multiple of that cash in funds for 
educational expenses as a risky alternative. In addition, younger subjects were more likely to 
invest in education.24 Perhaps those with recent education experience were better able to assess 
the risk and potential return involved in an investment in education. 
The decision to save for a family member’s education is somewhat different from that of 
investing in one’s own education. Again, patient participants were more likely to save for a 
family member’s education, but in contrast to investing in one’s own education, a subject’s 
attitude towards risk played no role. The education of a family member does not involve a risky 
situation for the subject, as such. 
Two behavioral characteristics that are typically not observed in policy evaluations, 
patience and attitude towards risk, are key to understanding the determinants of educational 
investment for the low-income individuals in this experiment. More research is needed to 
understand the structure of the risk in investing in education and the factors that can develop a 
more forward-looking, patient view of savings and investment.   
                                                
23 For example, Holt and Laury (2002) show that higher stakes increase risk aversion in a convenience sample of 
student subjects, particularly for male participants. 
24 This is shown in Tables 3 and 8, comparing student to all. The student variable is, however, insignificant in the 
ordered probit of Table 7. They are a relatively small part of the sample, representing only 12%.  
 
 
32 
References 
 
Albrecht, K., Volz, K. G., Sutter, M., Laibson, D. I., von Cramon, D. Y.  2010. What is for me is 
not for you: brain correlates of intertemporal choice for self and other. Social Cognitive 
and Affective Neuroscience, forthcoming. 
 
Andersen, S., Harrison, G., Lau, M., Rutström, E.,  2006. Elicitation using multiple price list 
formats.  Experimental Economics 9, 383-405. 
 
Ashraf, N. 2009. Spousal Control and Intra-household Decision Making: An Experimental Study 
in the Philippines. American Economic Review, 99, 1245–1277. 
 
Banerjee, A. V., Duflo, E., 2008.  The Experimental Approach to Development Economics.  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Working paper, Department of Economics and 
Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. 
 
Bound, J., Turner, S., 2002. Going to war and going to college.  Journal of Human Resources 20, 
784-815. 
 
Becker, G., Mulligan, C., 1997. The endogenous determination of time preference. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 112 , 729-58.  
 
Binswanger, H. P., 1980. Attitude towards risk: Experimental Measurement in rural India. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62, 395-407. 
 
Burks, S., Carpenter, J., Goette, L., Rustichini, A., 2009. Cognitive skills explain economic 
preferences, strategic behavior, and job attachment.  Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 106, 7745-7750 
 
Cameron, S., Heckman, J., 1998. Life cycle schooling and dynamic selection bias: Models and 
evidence for five cohorts of American males. Journal of Political Economy 106, 262-333. 
 
Cardenas, J. C., Carpenter, J., 2008. Behavioural Development Economics: Lessons from Field 
Labs in the Developing World. Journal of Development Studies, 44, 311 – 338 
 
Charness, G., and Gneezy, U.  2010.  Portfolio Choice and Risk Attitudes: An Experiment.  
Economic Inquiry, 48: 133–146.  
 
Chen, Stacey. H., 2002. Is investing in college education risky? Working paper, Department of 
Economics, State University of New York at Albany. 
 
de Oliveira, A., Croson, R.,  and Eckel, C.  2011.  “The Giving Type: Identifying Donors.”   
Journal of Public Economics 95:428-435. 
 
Dynarski, S., 2002. The behavioral and distributional implications of aid to college. American 
Economic Review 92, 279-85. 
 
 
33 
 
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D.,  Sunde, U. 2010. Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related 
to Cognitive Ability? American Economic Review, 100, 1238-60. 
 
Eckel, C., Grossman, P., 2008.  Forecasting risk attitudes: An experimental study using actual 
and forecast gamble choices.  Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 68, 1-17.    
 
Eckel, C., Johnson, C., Montmarquette, C., 2002. Will the working poor invest in human capital? 
A laboratory experiment. Working paper 02-01, Social Research and Demonstration 
Corporation, (http://www.srdc.org/uploads/workingpoor.pdf) 
 
Eckel, C., Johnson, C., Montmarquette, C., 2005. Saving decisions of the working poor: Short 
and long-term horizons. Research in Experimental Economics, Volume 10: Field 
Experiments in Economics, edited by J. Carpenter, G. Harrison, J. List. 
 
Eckel, C., Johnson, C., Montmarquette, C., Rojas, C., 2007. Debt aversion and the demand for 
loans for post-secondary education. Public Finance Review 35, 233-262. 
 
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., Donoghue, T.O., 2002. Time discounting and time preference: A 
critical review. Journal of Economic Literature XL, 351-401.  
 
Harrison, G., W.,  Lau, M.I., Williams, M.B., 2002. Estimating individual discount rates in 
Denmark: A field experiment.  American Economic Review 92, 1606-1617. 
 
Harrison, G. W., Humphrey, S. J., Verschoor, A.,  2009. Choice under Uncertainty: Evidence 
from Ethiopia, India and Uganda,  Economic Journal, 120, 80-104. 
 
Holt, C.A., Laury, S., 2002.  Risk aversion and incentive effects.  American Economic Review 
92, 1644-1655.   
 
Heckman, J.J., Lochner, L.J., Todd, P.E., 2008.  Earnings functions and rates of retrurn. Journal 
of Human Capital 2, 1-31. 
 
Karlan, D. S. 2005. Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict 
Financial Decisions." American Economic Review, 95, 1688–1699. 
 
Keane, M.P., 2002.  Financial aid, borrowing constraints and college attendance: Evidence from 
structural estimates.  American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 92, 293-97. 
 
Keane, M.P., Wolpin, K.I., 2000.  Eliminating race differences in school attainment and labor 
market success.  Journal of Labor Economics 18, 614-52.  
 
Kingwell, P., Dowie, M., Holler, B., Vincent, C., Gyarmati, D., Cao, H., 2005. Design and 
implementation of a program to help the poor save: The learn$ave project.  Social 
Research and Demonstration Corporation 
(http://www.srdc.org/uploads/learnsave_implementation.pdf). 
 
 
34 
 
Laibson, D. I., Repetto, A., and Tobacman, J., 1998. Self-control and saving for retirement.  
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 91–196. 
 
Levhari, D. Weiss, Y., 1974. The effect of risk on the investment in human capital.  American 
Economic Review 64, 950-963. 
 
Loewenstein, G., Thaler, R., 1989. Anomalies: Intertemporal choice. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 3, 181–93. 
 
Meier, S., Sprenger, C. 2010.   Present-Biased Preferences and Credit Card Borrowing. 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Volume 2, Number 1, January 2010 , 
pp. 193-210(18) 
 
O’Donoghue, T., Rabin, M., 2001. Choice and procrastination. Quarterly Journal of Economics 
116, 121-160.  
 
Roth, A., 2002. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as 
tools for design economics.  Econometrica 70, 1341-78. 
   
Samuelson, P., 1937.  A note on the measurement of utility.  Review of Economics Studies 4, 
155-161. 
 
Statistics Canada, Low-income division, 2001.  Low income cutoffs from 1991-2000. 
Publication # 75F0002MIE – 01007. 
 
Stefor, N., Turner, S., 2002.  Back to school: Federal student aid policy and adult college 
enrollment.  Journal of Human Resources 37, 336-52. 
 
Tanaka, T., Camerer, C. F., Nguyen, Q.  2010.  Risk and Time Preferences: Linking 
Experimental and Household Survey Data from Vietnam.  American Economic Review 
100, 557-571.   
 
Weber, E., Shafir, S., Blais, A-R., 2004.  Predicting risk-sensitivity in humans and lower 
animals:  Risk as variance or coefficient of variation.  Psychological Review 111, 430-
455. 
 
Weiss, Y., 1972.  The risk element in occupational and educational choices.  Journal of Political 
Economy 80, 1203-1213. 
  
  
1 
Appendix A 
Materials Related to the Experiment 
”Human Capital Investment by the Poor:  
Informing Policy with Laboratory and Field Experiments”
  
Instructions 
 
The rules: 
1. You are asked to complete two questionnaires. The first questionnaire (64 questions) is made of choice 
questions. The second questionnaire (43 questions) is made of information questions. All answers will be 
treated confidentially. 
2. You win at least $12, but you can make a great deal more. 
3. You must answer each question, without exception. This is the only way to win a prize. 
4. If you have any questions once you have started answering the questionnaire, please raise your hand, and 
someone will help you. 
 
The payment procedure: 
Once you have answered all the questions in the survey, you will be invited to meet with me to determine the 
prize you win. This prize will be determined in the following manner: 
1. A ball will be drawn randomly from an urn containing 64 balls, numbered from 1 to 64 representing all the 
choice questions of the survey. The urn does not include balls for the information questions. 
2. The ball drawn identifies the question that determines your prize following your choice at that question.  
3. Some monetary prizes will be given in cash, others will be mailed at a specific date. You will have to sign a 
receipt. In the cases of non-monetary prizes, you will receive an IOU certificate and your prize will be 
delivered to you by a special courier in the first weeks of January. 
 
A practice questionnaire: 
1. To familiarise you with the types of choice questions of the survey, you are invited to answer 6 questions 
(numbered 1 to 6) of a training questionnaire.  
2. Once this is done by all participants, we will draw a few balls from the urn to illustrate the payment procedure.  
 
v The whole survey should take less than 90 minutes to be completed.  
v Please note that there is no wrong or right answer, we want to know what YOU think. 
4
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Categories of prizes Symbols 
 
Cash: 
 
Money (in Canadian dollars) given to you now or at a 
later date. 
 
 
Non monetary prizes: 
 
 
Investment in your education and training: 
Ø This category includes expenses incurred for your own 
education and training: admission fees at an 
educational institution (professional, collegial, or 
university), purchases of didactic material (books, 
software, or others). 
Ø If you win this prize, we will refund your expenses made 
during the next year at any educational institutions. 
 
 
Investment in the education of a family member: 
Ø This category includes expenses incurred for your 
children’s (or any other family member) education: 
admission fees at an educational institution 
(professional, collegial, or university), purchases of 
didactic material (books, software, or others). 
Ø If you win this prize, your child (or any other family 
member) will receive a financial asset (certificate of 
deposit) bearing interests with a fixed maturity of 
5 years. 
 
 
Investment in your retirement plan: 
Ø This category is money saved for your retirement. 
Ø If you win this prize, you will receive a financial asset 
(certificate of deposit) bearing interests with a fixed 
maturity of 7 years. 
 
Purchase or maintenance of durable goods: 
Ø This category includes any expenses that you are 
planning to do in a near future (less than a year) and 
which are related to the purchase of durable goods 
(computer, electronic good, car, etc.) or to the 
maintenance of these goods (home repair, car repair, 
etc.). 
Ø If you win this prize, you will receive a RONA gift 
certificate. 
 
 
  
Information Questions 
 
Please take a few minutes to answer the following questions. Please remember that 
all information will be kept confidential and that your name will never be associated 
with any information from the survey. 
 
1.  In your opinion, were the survey instructions clear? 
* Yes 
* No 
 
2. In what year were you born? 
  19** 
  
3. Are you male or female? 
* Male 
* Female 
 
4. What is your current marital status? 
* Married 
* Common law 
* Single, never married 
* Separated 
* Divorced 
* Widowed 
 
5. If you have any children under the age of 18 living with you at this time, please 
indicate their year of birth below: 
**** child 1  **** child 2 
**** child 3  **** child 4   
**** child 5  **** child 6    
_____ 7 or more children 
 
6. How many years of schooling have you completed? Circle one. 
 
0 —1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9 — 10 — 11 — 12 — 13— 14—15—16+ 
 
 
 
 5 
7. Do you have any of the following educational credentials? (Please provide an 
answer for each): 
a. A high school diploma    1* Yes        2* No 
b. A college diploma     1* Yes        2* No 
c. A trade/vocational diploma or certificate  1* Yes        2* No 
d. An apprenticeship diploma   1* Yes        2* No 
e. A university degree    1* Yes        2* No 
f. Any other diplomas or degrees (please specify) :_____________________ 
 
8. Have you ever been enrolled in any other kind of school such as (include both full-
time and part-time enrolment): Mark all that apply. 
* Community college?      
* Business school?      
* Technical institute/trade, vocational or other?  
* University?  
  
9. Are you currently enrolled in any education or training? 
* Yes  If yes, please specify_______________________________ 
* No 
  
10. What do you consider to be your current main activity? Mark one only. 
* Caring for family 
* Working for pay or profit    
* Looking for paid work 
* Going to school 
* Household work 
* Parental leave (from paid employment) 
* Long-term illness/disability 
* Retired 
* Other, please specify______________________________________ 
 
11. Do you currently do any paid work? 
* Yes   
* No   If No, proceed to Question 16. 
  
12. In this job, are you a paid worker or self-employed? 
 * Paid worker    
* Self-employed 
* Does not apply 
 
  
13. How many weeks during the year do you work at this job or business? 
 **Weeks 
* Does not apply 
 
 
14. How many days a week do you work at this job or business?  
 ** Days 
* Does not apply 
 
15. What is your wage or salary at this job?  Complete only one. 
$______ Hourly  
$______ Daily 
$______ Weekly 
$______ Bi-weekly 
$______ Semi-monthly 
$______ Monthly 
$______ Yearly 
 
16. Is there another source of income for your household?  
* Yes 
 * No   
 
17. What is your best estimate of your total annual household income? Mark only one. 
* $0–$9,999 
* $10,000–$14,999 
* $15,000–$19,999 
* $20,000–$24,999 
* $25,000–$29,999 
* $30,000–$34,999 
* $35,000–$39,999 
* $40,000–$44,999 
* $45,000–$49,999 
* over $50,000 
 
18. Do you have a budget that is written down somewhere?  
* Yes 
 * No   
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19. Do you have a system for keeping track of your expenses? For example, do you keep 
track of expenses in a notebook?  
* Yes 
 * No   
 
20. Do you have a savings account that you contribute to regularly?  
* Yes 
 * No   
 
21. Do you have a credit card?  
* Yes 
 * No   
 
22. Do you own your home? 
* Yes 
 * No   
 
23. Do you own an automobile?  
* Yes 
 * No   
  
24. Generally speaking, do you feel: 
* most people can be trusted? 
* you can’t be too careful when dealing with people? 
 
25. If you lost a wallet or purse that contained $200.00, how likely is it to be returned 
with the money in it if it was found by someone who lives close by?  
* Very likely 
* Somewhat likely 
* Not likely at all 
* Don’t know  
 
26. If you lost a wallet or purse that contained $200.00, how likely is it to be returned 
with the money in it if it was found by a clerk at the grocery store where you do most 
of your shopping?  
* Very likely 
* Somewhat likely 
* Not likely at all 
* Don’t know  
 
  
27. If you lost a wallet or purse that contained $200.00, how likely is it to be returned 
with the money in it if it was found by a police officer?  
* Very likely 
* Somewhat likely 
* Not likely at all 
* Don’t know  
 
28. If you lost a wallet or purse that contained $200.00, how likely is it to be returned 
with the money in it if it was found by a complete stranger?  
* Very likely 
* Somewhat likely 
* Not likely at all 
* Don’t know  
 
29. Do you buy lottery tickets? 
* Yes, every week         If weekly, how many per week? ____________        
* Yes, occasionally 
* Yes, very rarely 
* Never 
 
30. When you buy a home appliance, do you buy extended warranty coverage? 
* Yes 
* No 
* I have never bought a home appliance 
 
31. Do you worry about having financial difficulties in your old age? 
* Yes, I worry quite a bit 
* Yes, I worry somewhat 
* No, I do not worry at all 
 
32. Do you contribute to a retirement plan? 
* Yes 
* No 
 
33. If there is something that you are not looking forward to (for example, some people 
dread going to their regular dental visit, a physical check-up, or a driving licence 
renewal), do you typically postpone this activity as long as you can?  
* Yes 
* No 
  
34. You have been given a prize of a wonderful meal (for two) in a very good restaurant 
in Montreal, but the offer is only good for one year. Do you:  
* use the prize as soon as possible? 
* wait for a while before using the prize? 
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The next set of questions describes the way some people feel about how much 
control they have over their lives. After each statement please indicate whether you 
strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree. 
 
35. You have little control over the things that happen to you. 
* Strongly disagree                   
* Disagree 
* Agree 
* Strongly agree 
 
36. There is really no way you can solve some of the problems you have.  
* Strongly disagree                   
* Disagree 
* Agree 
* Strongly agree 
 
37. There is little you can do to change many of the important things in your life.  
* Strongly disagree                   
* Disagree 
* Agree 
* Strongly agree 
 
38. You often feel helpless in dealing with the problems of life.  
* Strongly disagree                   
* Disagree 
* Agree 
* Strongly agree 
 
39. Sometimes you feel that you are being pushed around in life.  
* Strongly disagree                   
* Disagree 
* Agree 
* Strongly agree 
 
40. What happens to you in the future mostly depends on you.  
* Strongly disagree                   
* Disagree 
* Agree 
* Strongly agree 
 
  
41. You can do just about anything you really set your mind to do.  
* Strongly disagree                   
* Disagree 
* Agree 
* Strongly agree 
 
42. Please indicate with a check mark () the community groups in which you 
participate: 
* ACEM 
* Association culturelle Tamoul du Canada 
* Association Latino-Americaine de CDN 
* Black community association CDN 
* Centre communautaire CDN 
* Centre culturel et communautaire des Iraniens 
* Centre d’action socio-communautaire 
* Centre d’integration multi-service de l’ouest 
* Centre Generation Emploi 
* Centre Multi-ecoute 
* Centre Multi-Ethnique 
* Centre social d’aide aux immigrants 
* Cercles d’emprunt de Montreal 
* Chinese Family Services 
* Cloverdale Multi-Resource 
* Club de recherche d’emploi 
* Communaute Hellenique 
* Communaute Vietnamienne 
* Conseil communautaire CDN/Snowdon 
* Dawson College training and dev. center 
* Dawson community centre 
* English Montreal Adult Ed. Centre 
* Groupe conseil St-Denis 
* Head & Hands 
* Italian women’s center 
* Jamaica Association of Montreal 
* James Ling Adult Education Centre 
* Jewish Family Services 
* John Abbott College Adult Ed. 
* Le Trait d’union 
* Montreal Assoc. of Black Business Professionals 
* Montreal West Community Center 
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* NDG Anti poverty group 
* NDG Black community association 
* NDG Community Center 
* NDG Community Council 
* Project Genesis 
* SACLI 
* SAJE Montreal Centre 
* SAJE Pointe Claire 
* South Asian Women’s Community Centre 
* Tyndale-St. Georges 
* West Island Community Resource Centre 
* West Island volunteer bureau 
* West Island women’s shelter 
*Women’s centre of Montreal 
* Youth employment services 
* YMCA Enterprise Center 
* YWCA and asociated groups 
* Other:_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
CDEC 
* Ahuntsic- Cartierville 
* CDEC LaSalle, Lachine, St-Pierre 
* CDEST 
* CDN-NDG 
* Centre Nord 
* Centre Sud – Plateau Mont Royal 
* Corporation de relance economique communautaire 
* RESO sud-ouest 
* Rosemont & Petite Patrie 
* SODEC RDP Pointe aux Trembles 
 
43. After you answer this question, the survey is complete. Are you confident that you 
will be paid in the way described to you at the beginning of the survey?  
* Yes 
* No 
 
 
When you have finished, please give the two answered questionnaires. You are invited 
to randomly select the choice question for which you will receive compensation
  
 
Appendix B 
Decision Summary 
”Human Capital Investment by the Poor: Informing Policy with 
Laboratory and Field Experiments”
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Table B.1: Summary Description of Time Preference Decisions     
 (Bolded Decision Order used in Analysis) 
 Smaller Sooner (SS) Payment ($)     
 
Decision 
Number 
 
Today 
Earliest 
Tomorrow 
Payoff 
Next 
Week 
Two 
Weeks  
Days 
Lapsed for 
Later 
Payoff 
Larger 
Later (LL) 
Payment 
($) 
Rate of 
Return 
(%) 
Percent 
choosing 
SS 
6    71.50  2 71.54 10 80.9 
2    71.15  3 71.21 10 77.3 
17    71.20  7 71.34 10 80.5 
12    71.10  14 71.37 10 84.8 
4    71.00  28 71.54 10 87.1 
9    72.00  2 72.20 50 74.6 
3    72.15  3 72.45 50 74.2 
13    72.25  7 72.94 50 78.1 
10    72.10  14 73.48 50 77.7 
8    72.05  28 74.81 50 82.8 
19   73.25   2 74.05 200 52.3 
11   73.10   3 74.30 200 58.6 
14   73.00   7 75.80 200 52.7 
21   73.30   14 78.92 200 46.5 
18   73.15   28 84.37 200 49.6 
20    73.25  2 74.05 200 54.3 
22    73.10  3 74.30 200 57.4 
15    73.00  7 75.80 200 53.1 
24    73.30  14 78.92 200 55.1 
25    73.15  28 84.37 200 55.1 
26     73.25 2 74.05 200 51.6 
16     73.10 3 74.30 200 60.2 
5     73.00 7 75.80 200 59.0 
28     73.30 14 78.92 200 62.1 
23     73.15 28 84.37 200 58.2 
7  72.25    2 73.75 380 55.9 
29  72.10    3 74.35 380 50.0 
30  72.00    7 77.25 380 38.7 
32  72.50    14 83.07 380 41.8 
33   72.25   2 73.75 380 53.5 
35   72.10   3 74.35 380 44.9 
36   72.00   7 77.25 380 36.7 
1   72.50   14 83.07 380 39.8 
37   26.15   2 26.69 380 62.9 
27   26.05   3 26.86 380 68.8 
24   26.25   7 28.16 380 53.5 
31   26.10   14 29.90 380 58.6 
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Table C.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion 
 Reference Population 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Main 
Activity: 
Labour Force 
(Worker + 
Unemployed 
+ On Leave) 
 
 
Main Activity: 
Non-labour 
Force (Family 
+ Housework) 
 
 
 
Main 
Activity: 
Student 
Low 
Income: 
Family 
Income Less 
Than 120% 
of LICOs 
 
 
 
 
 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
Women 
 
 
 
 
 
All 
Age 34.31 
(10.1) 
32.39 
(9.00) 
28.06 
(8.99) 
34.14 
(10.26) 
34.73 
(11.0) 
31.66 
(8.78) 
33.71 
(10.4) 
Male 0.362 0.258 0.323 0.292   0.332 
Living with a 
partner  
Partner 
 
 
0.297 
 
 
0.484 
 
 
0.226 
 
 
0.286 
 
 
0.388 
 
 
0.269 
 
 
0.309 
Number of 
children 
under 18  
Under18 
 
 
0.524 
(0.891) 
 
 
1.613 
(1.022) 
 
 
0.419 
(0.765) 
 
 
0.789 
(1.02) 
 
 
0.447 
(0.809) 
 
 
0.725 
(1.006) 
 
 
0.633 
(0.953) 
Number of 
children 
under 13  
Under13 
 
 
0.405 
(0.754) 
 
 
1.516 
(1.029) 
 
 
0.355 
(0.709) 
 
 
0.649 
(0.915) 
 
 
0.424 
(0.762) 
 
 
0.573 
(0.900) 
 
 
0.523 
(0.858) 
Number of 
children 
under 5  
Under5 
 
 
0.178 
(0.424) 
 
 
0.839 
(0.735) 
 
 
0.194 
(0.477) 
 
 
0.319 
(0.572) 
 
 
0.224 
(0.497) 
 
 
0.269 
(0.529) 
 
 
0.254 
(0.518) 
Number of 
children 
0.524 
(0.891) 
1.61 
(1.02) 
0.419 
(0.765) 
0.789 
(1.02) 
0.447 
(0.809) 
0.725 
(1.01) 
0.633 
(0.952) 
Single parent 
household 
Single 
Parent 
 
 
 
0.157 
 
 
 
0.452 
 
 
 
0.161 
 
 
 
0.243 
 
 
 
0.00235 
 
 
 
0.281 
 
 
 
0.195 
Number of 
years of 
schooling 
completed 
Yrs School 
 
 
 
 
13.811 
(2.765) 
 
 
 
 
12.000 
(3.173) 
 
 
 
 
14.097 
(2.071) 
 
 
 
 
13.259 
(3.044) 
 
 
 
 
13.565 
(2.962) 
 
 
 
 
13.614 
(2.736) 
 
 
 
 
13.598 
(2.807) 
High school 
diploma 
Hsdeg 
 
 
0.773 
 
 
0.710 
 
 
0.871 
 
 
0.773 
 
 
0.741 
 
 
0.801 
 
 
0.781 
College 
diploma 
Coldeg 
 
 
0.459 
 
 
0.161 
 
 
0.452 
 
 
0.416 
 
 
0.365 
 
 
0.444 
 
 
0.418 
Trade/voca-
tional 
certificate or 
diploma 
Vocdeg 
 
 
 
 
0.259 
 
 
 
 
0.355 
 
 
 
 
0.129 
 
 
 
 
0.270 
 
 
 
 
0.224 
 
 
 
 
0.263 
 
 
 
 
0.250 
Apprenticeship 
diploma 
Appdeg 
 
 
0.108 
  
 
0.0645 
 
 
0.103 
 
 
0.0941 
 
 
0.0994 
 
 
0.0977 
(continued) 
  
16  
Table C.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion (Cont’d) 
 Reference Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Main 
Activity: 
Labour 
Force 
(Worker + 
Unemployed 
+ On Leave) 
 
 
 
Main Activity: 
Non-labour 
Force (Family 
+ Housework) 
 
 
 
 
Main 
Activity: 
Student 
 
Low 
Income: 
Family 
Income Less 
Than 120% 
of LICOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All 
 n=184 n=31 n=31 n=185 n=85 n=171 n=256 
University 
degree 
Univdeg 
 
 
0.314 
 
 
0.0645 
 
 
0.0968 
 
 
0.211 
 
 
0.306 
 
 
0.234 
 
 
0.258 
Any other 
degrees or 
diplomas 
Otherdeg 
 
 
 
0.124 
 
 
 
0.0645 
 
 
 
0.0968 
 
 
 
0.108 
 
 
 
0.0941 
 
 
 
0.123 
 
 
 
0.113 
Any community 
college credit 
Cccre 
 
 
0.411 
 
 
0.226 
 
 
0.452 
 
 
0.411 
 
 
0.365 
 
 
0.404 
 
 
0.391 
Any business 
school credit 
Buscre 
 
 
0.0865 
 
 
0.161 
 
 
0.0645 
 
 
0.0973 
 
 
0.0706 
 
 
0.0994 
 
 
0.0898 
Any technical 
institute, 
trade, or 
vocational 
school  
Techcre 
 
 
 
 
 
0.265 
 
 
 
 
 
0.258 
 
 
 
 
 
0.226 
 
 
 
 
 
0.292 
 
 
 
 
 
0.271 
 
 
 
 
 
0.275 
 
 
 
 
 
0.273 
Any university 
courses 
Unicre 
 
 
0.541 
 
 
0.258 
 
 
0.452 
 
 
0.459 
 
 
0.471 
 
 
0.503 
 
 
0.492 
Currently 
enrolled 
Student 
 
 
0.216 
 
 
0.258 
 
 
0.839 
 
 
0.286 
 
 
0.306 
 
 
0.287 
 
 
0.293 
Main activity is 
caring for 
family 
Family 
  
 
 
0.903 
  
 
 
0.146 
 
 
 
0.0941 
 
 
 
0.117 
 
 
 
0.109 
Main activity is 
working for 
pay or profit 
Worker 
 
 
 
0.670 
   
 
 
0.400 
 
 
 
0.518 
 
 
 
0.468 
 
 
 
0.484 
Main activity is 
looking for 
paid work 
Unempl 
 
 
 
0.281 
   
 
 
0.227 
 
 
 
0.247 
 
 
 
0.181 
 
 
 
0.203 
Main activity is 
school ing 
Student 
   
 
1.000 
 
 
0.119 
 
 
0.118 
 
 
0.123 
 
 
0.121 
Main activity is 
household 
work 
Hsework 
  
 
 
0.0968 
  
 
 
0.0162 
  
 
 
0.0175 
 
 
 
0.0117 
(continued) 
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Table C.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion (Cont’d) 
 Reference Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Main 
Activity: 
Labour 
Force 
(Worker + 
Unemployed 
+ On Leave) 
 
 
 
Main Activity: 
Non-labour 
Force (Family 
+ Housework) 
 
 
 
 
Main 
Activity: 
Student 
 
Low 
Income: 
Family 
Income Less 
Than 120% 
of LICOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All 
 n=184 n=31 n=31 n=185 n=85 n=171 n=256 
Main activity is 
being on 
parental leave 
(from paid 
employment)  
Onleave 
 
 
 
 
 
0.108 
   
 
 
 
 
0.0108 
  
 
 
 
 
0.0117 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0781 
Main activity is 
being on long-
term illness/ 
disability 
Disabled 
    
 
 
 
0.0378 
 
 
 
 
0.0235 
 
 
 
 
0.0292 
 
 
 
 
0.0273 
Main activity is 
being retired 
Retired 
    
 
0.0162 
  
 
0.0175 
 
 
0.0117 
Main activity is 
something 
else 
Otheract 
    
 
 
0.0270 
  
 
 
0.0351 
 
 
 
0.0234 
Currently doing 
any paid work 
Anypaid 
 
 
0.741 
 
 
0.355 
 
 
0.387 
 
 
0.589 
 
 
0.588 
 
 
0.655 
 
 
0.633 
Paid worker 
Paidwork 
 
0.670 
 
0.226 
 
0.355 
 
0.513 
 
0.494 
 
0.585 
 
0.555 
Self-employed 
Selfemp 
 
0.703 
 
0.129 
 
0.0323 
 
0.0757 
 
0.0941 
 
0.0702 
 
0.0781 
Seasonal 
worker  
(<48 weeks)  
Seasonal 
 
 
 
0.432 
 
 
 
0.258 
 
 
 
0.290 
 
 
 
0.389 
 
 
 
0.388 
 
 
 
0.386 
 
 
 
0.387 
Part time  
(< 5 days) 
 
0.157 
 
0.0967 
 
0.290 
 
0.157 
 
0.118 
 
0.181 
 
0.160 
Additional 
sources of 
income 
Addinc 
 
 
 
0.422 
 
 
 
0.581 
 
 
 
0.419 
 
 
 
0.416 
 
 
 
0.388 
 
 
 
0.474 
 
 
 
0.445 
Best estimate 
of total annual 
household 
income 
Totinc 
 
 
 
4.070 
(2.648) 
 
 
 
2.710 
(1.371) 
 
 
 
3.355 
(2.751) 
 
 
 
2.508 
(1.486) 
 
 
 
4.235 
(2.562) 
 
 
 
3.532 
(2.542) 
 
 
 
3.766 
(2.565) 
A written 
Budget 
 
0.368 
 
0.516 
 
0.323 
 
0.416 
 
0.318 
 
0.415 
 
0.383 
(continued) 
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Table C.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion (Cont’d) 
 Reference Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Main 
Activity: 
Labour 
Force 
(Worker + 
Unemployed 
+ On Leave) 
 
 
 
Main Activity: 
Non-labour 
Force (Family 
+ Housework) 
 
 
 
 
Main 
Activity: 
Student 
 
Low 
Income: 
Family 
Income Less 
Than 120% 
of LICOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All 
 n=184 n=31 n=31 n=185 n=85 n=171 n=256 
Keep track of 
expenses 
Expfile 
 
 
0.476 
 
 
0.613 
 
 
0.516 
 
 
0.540 
 
 
0.435 
 
 
0.526 
 
 
0.496 
Regular 
contributions 
to a savings 
account 
Savings 
 
 
 
 
0.481 
 
 
 
 
0.548 
 
 
 
 
0.290 
 
 
 
 
0.476 
 
 
 
 
0.506 
 
 
 
 
0.444 
 
 
 
 
0.465 
Possess a 
credit card 
Credit 
 
 
0.573 
 
 
0.387 
 
 
0.516 
 
 
0.465 
 
 
0.459 
 
 
0.573 
 
 
0.535 
Own their own 
home 
Ownhome 
 
 
0.114 
  
 
0.0323 
 
 
0.0595 
 
 
0.0824 
 
 
0.0877 
 
 
0.0859 
Own their own 
car 
Owncar 
 
 
0.276 
 
 
0.258 
 
 
0.226 
 
 
0.222 
 
 
0.282 
 
 
0.257 
 
 
0.266 
Do you feel 
that generally 
most people 
can be 
trusted? 
Gentrust 
 
 
 
 
 
0.443 
 
 
 
 
 
0.258 
 
 
 
 
 
0.581 
 
 
 
 
 
0.395 
 
 
 
 
 
0.400 
 
 
 
 
 
0.444 
 
 
 
 
 
0.430 
Wallet or purse 
returned by 
someone 
living close by 
Wallcb 
 
 
 
 
0.600 
 
 
 
 
0.516 
 
 
 
 
0.452 
 
 
 
 
0.546 
 
 
 
 
0.506 
 
 
 
 
0.596 
 
 
 
 
0.566 
Wallet or purse 
returned by a 
clerk at 
regular 
grocery store 
Wallsto 
 
 
 
 
 
0.730 
 
 
 
 
 
0.742 
 
 
 
 
 
0.742 
 
 
 
 
 
0.708 
 
 
 
 
 
0.753 
 
 
 
 
 
0.731 
 
 
 
 
 
0.738 
Wallet or purse 
returned by a 
police officer 
Wallpol 
 
 
 
0.816 
 
 
 
0.839 
 
 
 
0.871 
 
 
 
0.811 
 
 
 
0.859 
 
 
 
0.807 
 
 
 
0.824 
Wallet or purse 
returned by a 
complete 
stranger 
Wallstr 
 
 
 
 
0.416 
 
 
 
 
0.419 
 
 
 
 
0.452 
 
 
 
 
0.416 
 
 
 
 
0.353 
 
 
 
 
0.444 
 
 
 
 
0.414 
(continued) 
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Table C.1: Survey Questions 
Descriptive Statistics: Mean (Standard-Deviation) or Proportion (Cont’d) 
 Reference Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Main 
Activity: 
Labour 
Force 
(Worker + 
Unemployed 
+ On Leave) 
 
 
 
Main Activity: 
Non-labour 
Force (Family 
+ Housework) 
 
 
 
 
Main 
Activity: 
Student 
 
Low 
Income: 
Family 
Income Less 
Than 120% 
of LICOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Women 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All 
 n=184 n=31 n=31 n=185 n=85 n=171 n=256 
Purchase lottery 
tickets 
Lottery 
 
 
0.740 
 
 
0.839 
 
 
0.613 
 
 
0.735 
 
 
0.753 
 
 
0.713 
 
 
0.727 
Purchase 
extended 
warranty 
coverage on 
appliances 
Warranty 
 
 
 
 
 
0.443 
 
 
 
 
 
0.548 
 
 
 
 
 
0.355 
 
 
 
 
 
0.465 
 
 
 
 
 
0.424 
 
 
 
 
 
0.462 
 
 
 
 
 
0.449 
Do NOT 
purchase 
extended 
warranty on 
appliances 
Nowarran 
 
 
 
 
 
0.427 
 
 
 
 
 
0.258 
 
 
 
 
 
0.355 
 
 
 
 
 
0.378 
 
 
 
 
 
0.400 
 
 
 
 
 
0.398 
 
 
 
 
 
0.398 
Worry about 
financial 
difficulties in 
old age 
Finworry 
 
 
 
 
0.697 
 
 
 
 
0.742 
 
 
 
 
0.677 
 
 
 
 
0.768 
 
 
 
 
0.600 
 
 
 
 
0.760 
 
 
 
 
0.707 
Contribute to 
retirement plan 
Retirement 
plan 
 
 
 
0.319 
 
 
 
0.129 
 
 
 
0.0968 
 
 
 
0.216 
 
 
 
0.247 
 
 
 
0.281 
 
 
 
0.270 
Put off 
unfavorable 
situations 
Dread 
 
 
 
0.319 
 
 
 
0.323 
 
 
 
0.161 
 
 
 
0.265 
 
 
 
0.259 
 
 
 
0.310 
 
 
 
0.293 
Do NOT delay 
delightful 
events 
Nosavor 
 
 
 
0.443 
 
 
 
0.516 
 
 
 
0.290 
 
 
 
0.454 
 
 
 
0.424 
 
 
 
0.444 
 
 
 
0.438 
Locus of control  
0=external, 
7=internal  
Locus of 
Control 
 
 
 
4.15 
(1.29) 
 
 
 
3.71 
(1.49) 
 
 
 
4.19 
(1.08) 
 
 
 
3.99 
(1.32) 
 
 
 
4.22 
(1.21) 
 
 
 
4.04 
(1.37) 
 
 
 
4.10 
(1.32) 
Associated with 
a community 
organization 
Local 
Community  
Organisation 
 
 
 
 
0.800 
 
 
 
 
0.935 
 
 
 
 
0.645?? 
 
 
 
 
0.816 
 
 
 
 
0.741 
 
 
 
 
0.836 
 
 
 
 
0.805 
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Table C.2: Investment Preference Decisions 
    Percentage of Participants Choosing the First Choice 
    Reference Populations 
Decision 
number 
in text First Choice 
Over 
Second 
Choice 
Decision 
Order 
Main Activity: 
Working Poor 
(Worker + 
Unemployed 
+ On Leave) 
Main Activity: 
Non-labour 
Force  
(Family + 
Housework) 
Main 
Activity: 
Student 
Low 
Income: 
Total 
Income 
Less Than 
120% of 
LICOs Men Women All 
 $100 edu $100 durables 52 33.5 41.9 58.1 33.0 47.1 32.2 37.1 
 $500 edu $500 save 53 51.9 54.8 67.7 54.1 63.5 47.4 52.7 
7 $500 edu $500 family 54 60.0 25.8 71.0 57.2 64.7 52.6 56.6 
1 $100 cash $200 edu 55 77.8 71.0 64.5 77.3 78.8 74.3 75.8 
2 $100 cash $600 family 56 54.1 29.0 71.0 53.1 55.3 52.6 53.5 
 $100 cash $600 save 57 54.6 45.2 67.7 56.2 67.1 48.0 54.3 
 $100 cash $200 durables 58 46.5 51.6 41.9 45.9 55.3 40.9 45.7 
3 $100 cash $600 edu 59 48.1 48.4 41.9 48.5 44.7 49.7 48.0 
4 $166 cash $500 family 60 63.8 35.5 77.4 61.9 60.0 63.2 62.1 
 $250 cash $500 save 61 75.7 61.3 87.1 73.2 82.4 69.6 73.8 
5 $100 cash $400 edu 62 56.8 61.3 35.5 56.7 55.3 55.0 55.1 
6 $250 cash $500 family  63 75.7 48.4 90.3 72.2 74.1 74.3 74.2 
 $166 cash $500 save 64 61.1 58.1 83.9 62.9 71.8 57.9 62.5 
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Table C.3: Time Preference Decisions (Bolded Decision Used in Analysis) 
 Percentage of Participants Choosing the Earliest Payoff (SS) 
 Reference Populations 
 
 
 
 
Decision 
Order 
 
Main Activity: 
Working Poor 
(Worker + 
Unemployed 
+ On Leave) 
 
 
Main Activity: 
Non-labour 
Force (Family 
+ Housework) 
 
 
 
Main 
Activity: 
Student 
Low 
Income: 
Total 
Income Less 
Than 120% 
of LICOs 
 
 
 
 
 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
Women 
 
 
 
 
 
All 
6 82.7 83.9 71.0 80.4 83.5 79.5 80.9 
2 80.5 67.7 71.0 76.3 76.5 77.8 77.3 
17 83.8 71.0 77.4 79.9 87.1 77.2 80.5 
12 87.6 77.4 77.4 85.1 82.4 86.0 84.8 
4 89.7 77.4 83.9 86.6 87.1 87.1 87.1 
9 76.8 77.4 64.5 76.3 76.5 73.7 74.6 
3 76.8 71.0 64.5 75.3 71.8 75.4 74.2 
13 80.0 77.4 71.0 79.4 82.4 76.0 78.1 
10 81.1 77.4 61.3 80.4 77.6 77.8 77.7 
8 85.9 67.7 80.6 82.5 84.7 81.9 82.8 
19 56.8 41.9 38.7 53.6 58.8 49.1 52.3 
11 61.1 58.1 45.2 58.8 63.5 56.1 58.6 
14 56.8 45.2 41.9 54.1 61.2 48.5 52.7 
21 51.4 32.3 38.7 49.5 52.9 43.3 46.5 
18 51.9 38.7 48.4 50.0 58.8 45.0 49.6 
20 57.3 48.4 48.4 55.7 60.0 51.5 54.3 
22 58.4 64.5 45.2 59.3 65.9 53.2 57.4 
15 56.2 45.2 48.4 57.2 61.2 49.1 53.1 
24 61.6 38.7 38.7 55.7 67.1 49.1 55.1 
25 60.5 41.9 38.7 55.7 63.5 50.9 55.1 
26 55.7 35.5 48.4 51.5 61.2 46.8 51.6 
16 62.7 54.8 48.4 60.3 63.5 58.5 60.2 
5 62.7 51.6 48.4 59.8 67.1 55.0 59.0 
28 66.5 51.6 51.6 62.4 70.6 57.9 62.1 
23 61.6 51.6 45.2 59.3 65.9 54.4 58.2 
7 64.3 48.4 25.8 54.1 67.1 50.3 55.9 
29 54.1 41.9 41.9 52.6 60.0 45.0 50.0 
30 42.7 29.0 29.0 38.7 50.6 32.7 38.7 
32 44.3 38.7 32.3 44.3 52.9 36.3 41.8 
33 55.7 54.8 41.9 55.7 58.8 50.9 53.5 
35 48.6 35.5 29.0 47.4 51.8 41.5 44.9 
36 38.9 29.0 29.0 39.2 45.9 32.2 36.7 
1 43.2 41.9 19.4 41.2 49.4 35.1 39.8 
37 64.3 64.5 54.8 65.5 65.9 61.4 62.9 
27 71.9 67.7 58.1 71.6 76.5 64.9 68.8 
34 55.1 51.6 48.4 55.7 63.5 48.5 53.5 
31 61.6 51.6 51.6 60.3 67.1 54.4 58.6 
 
 
   
Table C.4: Risk Preference Decisions (Bolded Decision Used in Analysis) 
  Percentage of Participants Choosing the Less Risky Choice 
  Reference Populations 
Decision 
number 
in text 
 
 
 
 
Decision 
Order 
 
Main Activity: 
Working Poor 
(Worker + 
Unemployed 
+ On Leave) 
 
 
Main 
Activity: 
Non-labour 
Force 
(Family + 
Housework) 
 
 
 
Main 
Activity: 
Student 
Low 
Income: 
Total 
Income 
Less 
Than 
120% of 
LICOs 
 
 
 
 
 
Men 
 
 
 
 
 
Women 
 
 
 
 
 
All 
3 38 75.1 67.7 64.5 70.6 77.6 69.6 72.3 
5 39 76.2 58.1 77.4 73.2 71.8 73.7 73.0 
6 40 74.1 71.0 74.2 73.2 75.3 72.5 73.4 
9 41 77.3 64.5 74.2 74.7 74.1 74.9 74.6 
7 42 74.1 51.6 58.1 69.1 70.6 68.4 69.1 
10 43 82.2 77.4 67.7 79.9 81.2 78.9 79.7 
13 44 75.1 67.7 71.0 72.2 76.5 70.8 72.7 
12 45 81.6 77.4 67.7 78.9 82.4 76.6 78.5 
2 46 60.5 71.0 64.5 62.4 65.9 59.6 61.7 
4 47 56.2 71.0 61.3 61.9 54.1 62.6 59.8 
11 48 63.8 58.1 58.1 61.3 56.5 65.5 62.5 
1 49 68.1 71.0 64.5 69.1 65.9 67.8 67.2 
8 50 75.7 77.4 77.4 77.3 82.4 72.5 75.8 
14 51 56.2 71.0 54.8 61.3 60.0 57.9 58.6 
 
